The Citizenship Dialectic by Roman, Ediberto
The Citizenship Dialectic
Ediberto Román
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................1 
II. The Classic Construction of Citizenship...................................................................................................7 
A. Citizenship’s Equality Component ....................................................................................................9 
B. The Exclusionary Aspect ..................................................................................................................14 
C. The Modern Construction ................................................................................................................19 
III. Subordinates in Law .................................................................................................................................29 
A. The Indigenous People......................................................................................................................28 
B. The Territorial Island Inhabitants ........................................................................................................36 
IV. Subordinates in Fact?................................................................................................................................43 
A. African-Americans..................................................................................................................................43 
B. Mexican-Americans............................................................................................................................54 
C. Other non-Whites ..............................................................................................................................58 
V. The Raced Nature of Naturalization........................................................................................................61 
VI.   The Contemporary Domestic Development……….………………………………………..58 
VII. A New Construction………………………………...……………..……….………………..65 
 
VIII. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................67 
 

 Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.  This 
is a footnoted version of presentations I have made at the 2004 Law & Society Conference and the 2005 People of 
Color Scholarship Conference at George Washington University.  I would like to thank Professors Richard Delgado, 
Jean Stefancic, Gerald Torres, Ian Haney Lopez, Michael Olivas, Kevin Johnson, Mary Romero, Joe Thome, Linda 
Greene, Thomas Baker, Jorge Esquirol, Carlton Waterhouse, and Hannibal Travis for their comments on this article.  
I would also like to thank reference librarian Ms. Jan Stone for her invaluable investigative assistance.
1I. Introduction
Imagine that you reside in a country not unlike the United States, with a similar cultural, 
economic, racial, and ethnic mix.  As in many other countries, the events of September 11, 2001 
dramatically changed the lives of the inhabitants of your land.  Your country passed a series of 
Special Laws specifically designed to enhance national security, and has joined the United States in 
its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Your country’s law enforcement and military officials, in several 
high-profile arrests that captured the attention of the populace, took three suspects into custody 
who allegedly were involved in terrorist related activities.  While these high-profile arrests occurred 
at slightly different times and in different places, the commonality is that the alleged wrongdoers 
were citizens of your country.  However, the commonalities end there.  As events have unfolded, 
your country’s treatment of these individuals varied greatly.   
The first stemmed from the capture of a young national actually fighting for the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. As a teenager, he discovered Islam and came to adopt Taliban and Al Qaeda 
beliefs.  He traveled to Egypt and Yemen to learn Arabic, trained for jihad in several training camps, 
and was said to have interacted with Osama Bin Laden. After his arrest, this individual was not 
treated pursuant to the Special Laws as an “enemy combatant,” a status which would have severely 
limited his constitutional rights, but proceeded through your country’s traditional criminal system.  
The official spokesman for your president declared that, “the great strength of this country is he will 
now have his day in court.”  He had his family with him throughout the initial process, had a bail 
hearing, was provided the right to counsel, eventually entered a plea agreement, and has begun to 
serve a twenty year prison sentence, instead of indefinite confinement as an enemy combatant or 
execution for treason.  The deferential treatment was largely due to his status as a citizen of your 
land. 
2The second individual was similarly born in your country and was captured in Afghanistan 
allegedly fighting with Taliban forces.  Unlike the first individual, this accused was treated as an 
“enemy combatant” and was immediately sent to a military jail.  Your government argued that as an 
enemy combatant, it could detain him indefinitely without formal charges or proceedings, and would 
allow him due process and access to counsel only when it deemed it necessary.  After a lengthy 
confinement in a military jail without any hearing or even charges leveled against him, the Supreme 
Court ordered that he was entitled to a meaningful hearing and ordered your government to either 
produce evidence of his crimes or to release him.  Your government never used the citizenship 
exception, as it did with the previous individual, to subject him to your land’s traditional criminal 
procedures.  Instead, it treated him as one of the scores of foreigners captured in Afghanistan.  
Ultimately, your government declared that this second individual no longer posed a threat to your 
country and entered into an agreement whereby this individual, without ever being convicted of any 
crime, would have his citizenship stripped, would be deported to his parent’s native land, and would 
be required to pledge never to return to your country.   
The third individual was arrested in your land because he was suspected of preparing a 
terrorist attack.  This individual, despite being a citizen of your land by virtue of being born there, 
was immediately held in indefinite detention as a material witness, and later as an “enemy 
combatant.”  Although he has been jailed for several years without trial, he faces indefinite 
confinement, and only recently has been given the chance to meet with counsel.  Even after one of 
your federal judges ordered that this individual either be charged with a crime or released, your 
government and its attorney general have declared that it will continue to detain him indefinitely, 
without trial, for the duration of hostilities in the war on terror.   
Arguably the three accused were alleged to have waged war against your land, yet they faced 
dramatically disparate treatment.  Now consider this.  The first individual, who was afforded your 
3country’s traditional criminal process and had his day in court with its right to counsel and other 
fundamental rights, is Caucasian.  The second, who was subject to potentially indefinite 
confinement, ultimately was convicted of no crime, and was effectively forced to agree to be 
expatriated from his land and have his citizenship dissolved, is of Arab decent.  The third, who 
remains in jail to this day and has yet to face a trial, is an ethnic minority descendant from one of 
your country’s overseas territories and, as such, is an excellent example of the subordinate 
citizenship status given to those islanders. 
As is evident to any newspaper reader, the above depiction is not based on a fictional 
portrayal, but on the actual events related to the arrests of John Walker Lindh,1 Yaser Esam Hamdi,2
and Jose Padilla.3 While the cases of these individuals may be more complex than the above 
suggests, the disparate treatment of three similarly-situated individuals allows critics of the judicial 
system to raise questions concerning the motivations behind and basis for the disparate treatment.4
Though many believe that the United States Government’s vastly different treatment of these three 
individuals was largely due to racial and class constructions,5 few, if any, scholars have fully explored 
1
 Ellen S. Podger, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Shall be Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109 Penn. St. 
L. Rev. 1059 (2005); Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1595 
(2005).
2
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F. 3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002).
3
 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y., 2002), rev’d, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. 
Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
4 See e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953 (2002); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive 
Power, Judicial Deference and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 1 (2002). See also “Rights and the New Reality; Self-Inflicted Wounds; Secret Deportation Hearings, U.S. 
Citizens Denied Due Process While in Custody.  These Evoke Memories of Dictatorships and Undermine the Health 
of Our Democracy,” Los Angeles Times. Sep. 10, 2002 at pg. B. 12 (Disparate treatment of Hamdi, Lindh, and 
Padilla drew questions from Senator McCain and other leaders, including at least one federal judge). 
5
 Natsu Taylor Saito, Interning the “Non-Alien” Other: The Illusory Protections Of Citizenship, 68 Law & 
Contemp. Probs 173, 208-10 (2005) (Padilla is both an internal Other by virtue of his race and ethnicity, and 
perceived as an external Other as a result of his conversion to Islam and the political associations attributed to him.); 
Joanna Woolman, The Legal Origins Of The Term “Enemy Combatant” Do Not Support Its Present Day Use, 7 J. 
L. & Soc. Challenges 145, 159-60 (2005); Eric K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the 
Courts to Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 285, 313-14 
(2005) (Lindh, a white American from a middle class family in California, fit the description for enemy combatant, 
but the government declined to label him as such; Hamdi, a U.S. citizen of Arab descent, and Padilla, a Puerto 
Rican, did not fit the description, but were labeled enemy combatants.) 
4the subject.6 Those scholars who have addressed these events have limited their analysis to the 
declared American enemy combatants—Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi.7 Nonetheless, the 
public criticisms of their treatment do not stem from de jure citizenship distinctions established for 
different groups.  Instead, the public criticism, to the extent there has been any, largely focuses on 
applying legal constructs to ethnically diverse groups.8
The post-September 11 events relating to the above well-known cases are recounted here 
not to raise questions concerning the application of criminal laws,9 but to demonstrate that the 
fundamental legal and societal construct known as citizenship, arguably the most important identity 
marker in both its legal construction and application, has always included gradations or levels of 
membership.10 In other words, differences in the legal treatment of those within a society who are 
supposed to be equal are not only not a new phenomenon, but are consistent with the citizenship 
6
 While not the focus of this project, a brief discussion of pertinent law relating to the treatment of citizens suspected 
of disloyalty is perhaps in order. The leading case on the subject is Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), where the 
Court addressed the propriety of a military court’s jurisdiction over a citizen who was not a member of a military 
force. The Court held that the military court had no jurisdiction over such a person, and rejected the government’s 
argument that the Bill of Rights did not apply during war. Id. at 118-30. The Court concluded that the military trial 
violated Milligan’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial before and impartial jury and his Fifth Amendment’s right to a 
grand jury. Id. The second leading case on the subject is Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). In that case, departing 
from Milligan, the Court refused to find that either the Fifth or Sixth Amendments prevented a naturalized U.S. 
citizen accused of conspiring with a foreign wartime enemy to be tried by a military tribunal. The found no 
distinction between citizen and foreign belligerents. Id. at 37-38. The Quirin Court distinguished the Milligan
decision by noting that “Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-
belligerent, not subject to the law of war…” Id. at 45. 
7 See, e.g., Juliet Stumpt, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional Rights of 
the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 79 (2004).  Much thanks are in order to Professor Charles Pouncy for 
raising the lack the failure of pundits to include John Walker Lindh in the enemy combatants debates at a Post-9/11 
civil rights conference at Florida International University.
8
 At least one other person has recently argued that the “enemy-combatant” cases of Hamdi and Padilla have blurred 
citizenship constructions.  See Stumpt, supra note 7.
9
 For a brilliant analysis of the civil rights versus national security debate post 9/11, read: THOMAS E. BAKER & 
JOHN F. STACK, AT WAR WITH CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES (Rowan & Littlefield, 2005).
10
 Well known is the ongoing struggle with the caste system of India, a phenomena acknowledged even in election 
laws that prevent inciting hatred between the classes of citizens.  Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Secularism's 
Last Sigh: The Hindu Right, the Courts, and India's Struggle for Democracy, 38 Harv. Int'l L.J. 113, 120.   Another 
obvious example is the treatment of Jews in Europe, who have a long history of being accorded less than full 
citizenship rights.  This treatment, dating to early in the Common Era, was memorialized by the Romans in the 
Theodosian Code of 425 C.E. and Justinian Code of 570 C.E., prohibiting participation in government, and 
restricting life, livelihood, and property ownership.  NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE SACRED CHAIN: THE 
HISTORY OF THE JEWS 110 (HarperCollins 1994).  Indeed, Justinian’s Code prescribed death for those who 
broke provisions requiring particular religious affiliations for all citizens.  Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom 
A Western Value?, 91 A.J.I.L. 593, 609 n.100 (1997).
5construct’s dark little secret.  That secret is the largely unexplored fact that the citizenship construct, 
although widely accepted as requiring equality among those with the status of citizen, also contains a 
lesser known aspect that fosters differences in the treatment of the inhabitants within a society.  
These differences typically are both more vivid and capture greater attention during times of crises.11
In fact, during the recent debates revolving around the appropriate level of civil rights protections 
available to accused terrorists after September 11, some writers have questioned the propriety of the 
treatment of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans, while others have championed differences in 
citizenship, effectively arguing that “some Americans are more equal than others.”12 In discussing 
the post-September 11 civil rights debate, one author observed that “[t]he pertinent question is not 
one of balancing, but one of determining which segments of American society deserve less 
constitutional protection than others in national crises.”13 Thus, the concept of citizenship implies a 
dialectic, 14 or a process of intellectual evolution and self-definition by means of the negation and 
transcendence of opposing ideas, between inclusion within a membership group and exclusion of 
nonmembers of the group that also defines the contours and meaning of the group itself.15
11 See, e.g., Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 73, 1 stat. 596 (expired 1891) (making it a federal offense to make false 
criticisms of the government or its officials, or to excite hatred of the people of the United States); Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (invalidating President Lincoln’s Suspension of the Writ of habeas corpus); Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 42 (1919) (the World War I era prosecution of war critics); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944 (the Japanese Internment case); Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (the McCarthy era 20 
year imprisonment of individuals for teaching the works of Marx and Lenin).
12 See, e.g., Arvin Lugay, “In Defense of Internment”: Why Some Americans Are More “Equal” Than Others, 12 
Asian L.J. 209 (2005) (book review of MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE 
FOR RACIAL PROFILING IN WORLD WAR TWO AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004)).  See also Jack Utter, 
The Discovery Doctrine, the Tribes, and the Truth, Indian Country Today, June 7, 2000 available at
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=2541.
13
 Lugay, supra note 12, at 209.
14
 Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 15 Berkeley J. Intl’l L. 159, 
187-190 (1997) (describing Hegelian dialectic); Michel Rosenfeld, Comment: Spinoza’s Dialectic and the 
Paradoxes of Tolerance: A foundation for Pluralism?, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 759, 767-770 (2003) (contrasting 
approaches to dialectic of Benedict de Spinoza and G.W.F. Hegel). 
15
 ETIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE?: REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CITIZENSHIP 1, 50, 57 (Princeton University Press, 2004) (describing citizenship as a “dialectic of conflicts and 
solidarities,” and specifically as a dialectic between “confrontation with the foreigner” and “communication between 
civilizations.”); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, 
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 1 (2001) (describing citizenship and naturalization laws as playing 
out a “dialectic of nation-building and minority rights”).
6The tension in the application of the citizenship construct is not limited to times of crises,16
but, at least in the domestic sense, has repeatedly arisen when disfavored groups sought full 
membership.17 In other words, the current criticisms of this government’s treatment of Arab and 
Muslim citizens after September 11 are not only reminiscent of the World War II Japanese 
internment cases, which are widely discussed in legal literature,18 but also the exclusion of disfavored 
groups from the definition of social and political citizenship prevalent throughout several thousand 
years of recorded history.19 Specifically, this article intends to demonstrate how the concept of 
citizenship in Western democracies20 has resulted in effects that are wholly inconsistent with the 
purportedly liberal ethos constructing citizenship itself.   
Indeed, this duality appears in the first writings on the subject, made over two thousand 
years ago,  where philosophers and politicians focused on equality for the members of a society, and 
in the same breath advocated the exclusion of many desirous of the status and, arguably, eligible to 
obtain it.21 Thus from its very genesis, the construct exhibits exclusionary as well as inclusive 
aspects, yet the vast majority of the general literature on the subject, and virtually all of the legal 
juridical and scholarly pontifications, focus on the more appealing inclusive component of the 
construct.  Citizenship’s egalitarian aspects will be compared here with the lesser-known, or at least 
16 See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 2; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
17 The central thesis here is to expose the fact that the gradations of membership have not merely arisen during the 
exigencies of war or political crises, but have always been part of the obstacles faced by disfavored groups seeking 
full membership. 
18 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of The Japanese Internment in the Post-
Hamdi World, 54 Kan. L. Rev. ___ (2006); See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 
Asian L.J. 195 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" 
of Arab Americans as "Terrorists", 8 Asian L.J. 1 (2001); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1575 (2002) ; See also Erwin Chermerinsky, Civil Liberties And the War on Terrorism, 45 Washburn L.J. 1 
(2005); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 847 (2005); Lee Epstein, 
Daniel E.Ho, Gary Fing, Jeddrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During Crises: How War Affects Only Non-War 
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. rev. 1 (2005); Earl M. Maltz, The Exigencies of War, 36 Rutgers L.J. 861 (2005).
19
 Recent scholarship on the war on terror has raised the questions of whether the concept of citizenship is itself a 
limit on executive power.  See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Citizenship Matters: The Enemy Combatant Cases, 19 Notre 
Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 33 (2005).  See also Utter, supra note 12 (tracing the role of the state as 
“institutionalized superiority of one people over another, found in the Discovery Doctrine” back to Aristotle.)
20 See MALKIN, supra note 12.
21
 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK III, Chapter 5.
7lesser–acknowledged, theoretical aspects, as well as its more recent domestic applications, which 
have repeatedly evidenced selective membership and exclusion.22 Part One explores various 
components of both ancient and contemporary citizenship theory.  This part demonstrates that 
citizenship theory has always extolled the virtues of equality, but has also supported the exclusion of 
less favored groups from the status.  Part Two explores the concept’s domestic development and 
demonstrates that the American experience of citizenship fits squarely within this article’s central 
thesis, namely citizenship rhetoric repeatedly champions a model of equality and inclusion, but in 
practice disfavored groups suffer repeated denial of full social, civil, and political citizenship rights.  
Part Three demonstrates that American constitutional history evinces the creation and maintenance 
of formal or de jure subordinate citizens, which include this country’s indigenous peoples and 
inhabitants of this country’s territorial island dependencies.  Part Four questions whether this 
country has also established de facto subordinate citizens.23 Specifically, this section posits that certain 
groups, such as African-Americans, were and perhaps still are less than full citizens despite attaining 
such status after the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  Unquestionably, the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision effectively confirmed 
Plessy’s “separate but equal” paradox that created de facto subordinates until the 1950’s.  Part Five 
explores the related de jure subordination of groups that should have been eligible for citizenship but 
were denied access to it because of the country’s exclusionary naturalization laws.  Finally, Part Six 
proposes an inclusive model for citizenship based on rights as well as status.                                                   
II. The Classic Construction of Citizenship
22 See Barron, supra note 19, at 34.
23
 The once de jure and arguably still de facto subordinate citizenship status of women may be further explored in 
the following articles. See, e.g., Gretchen Ritter, Women’s Citizenship and the Problem of Legal Parenthood in the 
United States in the 1960’s and 1970’s, 13 Tex. J. Women & L.J. 1 (2003); Catherine L. Fisk, In Pursuit of Equity: 
Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in the 20th Century America, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 409 (2003); 
Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace 
Accords, 26 Yale J. Inl’t L. 103 (2001).
8Although over thirty years ago a leading constitutionalist declared that the concept of 
citizenship is of little significance in American constitutional law,24 the last two decades have 
witnessed what several writers have declared “an explosion of interest in the concept of 
citizenship.”25 The renewed theoretical focus was sparked by recent world-wide political events and 
trends including, but not limited to, increasing voter apathy and long-term welfare dependency in 
the United States, the resurgence of nationalists movements in Eastern Europe, and the stresses 
created by increasingly multicultural and multiracial populations in Western Europe.26 More recent 
events such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and the United States’ 
ensuing domestic and global war on terrorism with its consequences to Arabs and Muslims both at 
home and abroad; the United States government’s ineffective efforts at rescuing the largely poor and 
African-American victims of the Gulf Coast of Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina along with the 
widespread characterization of those citizens as refugees; and the recent and ongoing ethnic 
uprisings in France suggest that scholarly interest will continue to focus on the subject of citizenship.  
While these events have led to a significant amount of public and media attention, they have not led 
to much scholarly debate concerning their implications on democratic and citizenship theories. 
 
24
 Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship In American Constitution, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (1973). In his book, Bickel 
argued that the Constitution’s Preamble speaks of “We the People,” not “We the Citizens.”  As such, the Bill of 
Rights applies to all people, irregardless of citizenship.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF 
CONSENT 36 (1975).  He argued that the concept of citizenship was not important to the framers and that “the 
original Constitution presented the edifying picture of a government that bestowed rights on people and persons, and 
held itself out as bound by certain standards of conduct in its relations with people and persons, not with some legal 
construct called citizen.”  
25
 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 
Ethics 352 (1994) (further noting that the concept of citizenship had been out of fashion since the late 1970’s).   
26 Id.  The authors suggest that the academic debate is seen as a “natural evolution in the political discourse because 
the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demand of justice and community membership, the central concepts 
of political philosophy in the 1970’s and 1980’s respectively. Citizenship is intimately linked to the ideas of 
individual entitlements, on the one hand, and of attachment to a particular community, on the other. Thus it may 
help to clarify what is really at stake in the debate between liberals and communitarians.” Id.
9Nevertheless, citizenship is the most basic of all rights, “the right to have 
rights.”27Accordingly, citizenship is a broadly conceived concept typically deemed a central 
component of Western civilization.  It is the adhesive that joins the Constitution,28 and binds the 
people to the republic.  It also embodies the strongest link between the individual and the 
government.29 
A. Citizenship’s Equality Component 
 With roots dating back to Athenian political leaders and philosophers such as Solon and 
Aristotle, the concept of citizenship served a pivotal role in the development of democratic order.  
Over 2500 years old, the concept remains to this day indispensable for the conceptual construction 
and understanding of basic elements of political and legal order.30 This term’s modern description 
varies little from the classic vision’s concept. 
In Book III of his Politics, Aristotle set forth the foundational statement concerning the 
concept’s roots.  He asserted that “a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts; 
these are the citizens, who compose it.”31 Equality among the citizenry is not only a timeless 
27 HANNAH ARENDT, THEE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979).  Arendt 
was one of the first to recognize that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were two sides of the same coin rather 
than opposing philosophies of Right and Left.
28 Johnny Parker, Johnny Came Home Again, A Critical Review of Contemporary Equal Protection Interpretation, 
37 How. L. J. 393, 396 (1994).  Parker wrote that “[t]he concept of citizenship is fundamental to constitutionally 
interpretation.”  Id.
29 Yaffa Zilbershats, Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship, 36 Tex. Int’l L. J. 689, 690 (2001).  Zilbershats, in 
noting that nationality is the manifestation between an individual and the State, writes that there is no clear 
international criteria for defining this connection.  Id. at 691.  “There is no clear international law stating in which 
circumstances a State must confer nationality upon a person and when a person has the right to become a citizen. 
The uncertainty and lack of definition in international law ensue from the fact that international law has sanctified 
the principle of State sovereignty and non-intervention on the part of one State in the affairs of another.”  Id.  As 
such, he says that “State sovereignty has primarily been reflected in the power of the State to determine who will be 
its permanent and preferred members, i.e., who will be its citizens. Indeed, every State has established its own rules 
regarding when, how, and upon whom nationality will be conferred.” Id.
30 ULRICH K. PREUSS, THE AMBIGUOUS MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP (2003).
31 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Book III 126.  (Chapter 1: “The State then is composite, and, like any other whole, 
made up of many parts, which are the citizens who compose it.”)
10
component of citizenship literature,32 but also a basis for the citizenship ideal,33 which is also the 
classic or dominant construction of the concept.  For instance, Aristotle likened political and social 
citizenship to the communitarian structure aboard a sailing vessel—although all sailors (or citizens) 
are specialized in their tasks aboard ship, all are indispensable members of a whole, without which 
the community cannot function.34 The classical construction also deeply influenced contemporary 
philosophers, such as John Locke, Alexis De Toqueville, and John Stuart Mill, who all recognized 
the significance of equality among the participants within a society.  John Locke is often cited as a 
primary influence on the founding fathers because Thomas Jefferson, in drafting the Declaration of 
Independence, admitted to drawing liberally from Locke’s Two Treatises on Government.35 In particular, 
the famous assertion that all men are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that 
among these are life liberty and the pursuit of happiness,”36 was drawn from Locke’s work almost 
verbatim.37 Mill found equality a central component of citizenship and democracy.  He used equality 
to advocate for granting citizenship status to women.38 De Toqueville in a similar vein declared “the 
more I advance in the study of American society, the more I perceive that the equality of condition 
is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to derive.”39 
32
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Articles and Commentary on Equality: In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor 
Western, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 575 (1983) (“No value is more thoroughly entrenched in Western culture than is the 
notion of equality”).
33
 Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245 (1983) (“[I]implicit in the values of citizenship . . . is 
the notion of equal membership in the community.”).
34 ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, chapter 4.
35 David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke’s Religious Beliefs on the Creation and Adoption 
of the United States Constitution, 26 Seattle U. L. Rev. 291, 297 (2002).
36
 The Declaration of Independence Para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
37
 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 168-69 (The Classics of Liberty Library, Special 
Edition, 1992).  Locke writes that men are born free and equal in rights.  While, all men are equal in the state of 
nature, civil society originates when men agree to delegate the function of punishing transgressors.  As such, the 
government is instituted by a “social contract,” with limited powers involving the reciprocity of obligations.
38
 JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 99 ( MIT Press, 1970) .  “That the principle which 
regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes — the legal subordination of one sex to the other — is 
wrong itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a 
principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.”  Id.  
39
 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 22 (1992).  After visiting America, Frenchman De 
Toqueville wrote this treatise about what America was like. 
11
In turn, the founding fathers of this country focused on equality of citizenship prior to the 
drafting of the Constitution.  For instance, the authors of the Federalist Papers addressed a form of 
citizenship endowed with equal rights.  John Jay in Federalist No. 2 observed that "to all general 
purposes we have uniformly been one people—each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same 
national rights, privileges and protection."40 Madison in Federalist No. 57 observed: 
Who are to be the electors of the Representatives [in Congress]. 
Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the 
ignorant; not the naughty heirs of distinguished names, more 
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. 
The electors are to be the great body of the people of the 
United States. No qualifications of wealth, of birth, of 
religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the 
judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.41 
With respect to the need to protect the citizenry, in Federalist No. 51 Madison notes: 
Is it of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the 
society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one 
part of society against the injustice of the other part. Different 
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a 
majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the 
minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of 
providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the 
community independent of the majority, that is, of the society 
itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many 
separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust 
combination of a majority of the whole improbable, if not 
impracticable.42
This egalitarian vision was eventually, though not initially, tracked in the supreme legal 
document of this country.  The United States Constitution’s central citizenship provision is 
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “All persons born and naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and the state 
40
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 at 10 (JOHN JAY).  But see also, JOHN P. ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (Cornell University Press, 1949).  Prior to the American Revolution, 
citizenship was a right granted by states and provided that “[a]n Englishman moving from one colony to another 
automatically attained citizenship in the latter.” Id. at 2.
41
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (JAMES MADISON).
42
 James Madison writings 1772-1836, 297 (Library of America, 2006).
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wherein they reside.”43 John Bingham, the primary drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
envisioned a concept centered on equality.44 He described the rights of citizens as: 
[T]he equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; 
to argue and to utter, according to conscience; to work and 
enjoy the product of their toil . . . the charm of that 
Constitution lies in the great democratic ideals which it 
embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in respect of 
those rights of person which God gives and no man or state 
may rightfully take away.45 
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly used similar declarations concerning 
citizenship.46 For instance, in Afroyim v. Rusk,47 Justice Black, following Aristotle’s language written 
over two thousand years earlier, declared “the citizenry is the country and the country is the 
citizenry.”48 Justice Brandeis declared in Ng Fung Ho v. White,49 that the “loss of citizenship was 
equivalent to the loss of everything that makes life worth living.”50 Over time, both jurists and 
scholars have shed considerable light on the importance of the term.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote 
in Sugarman v. Dougall51 that “citizenship is supposed to mean something, and something 
important.”52 Indeed, it has evolved to become something more than just being born or naturalized 
43 U.S. Const. Art. XIV, Sec. 2.
44 See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of 
Citizenship, 36 Akron L. Rev. 717, 719 (2003)  (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause 
envisioned a broad concept of citizenship).
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)
47 Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253.
48 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
49 Supra note 43.
50 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284.  Similar assessments in Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270-75 (1980) (spawned 
strong dissents from Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan, who demanded a high standard of evidence when 
determining the intent of a citizen to voluntarily renounce those rights he acquired at birth). 
51
 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1972) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
52 Id. “In constitutionally defining who is a citizen of the United States, Congress obviously thought it was doing 
something, and something important. Citizenship meant something, a status in and relationship with a society which 
is continuing and more basic than mere presence or residence. The language of that Amendment carefully
distinguishes between ‘persons’ who, whether by birth or naturalization, had achieved a certain status, and ‘persons’
in general. That a 'citizen' was considered by Congress to be a rationally distinct subclass of all 'persons' is obvious 
from the language of the Amendment.”  Id. at 652.
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within the United States.53 The grant of citizenship is the formal recognition of these concepts and 
guarantees certain rights and duties, including the right to suffrage54 and service on juries,55 as well as 
other important constitutional rights.56 Its importance, however, does not merely lie with the 
delineated rights identified by the courts and legislatures.57 Citizenship has become recognized as a 
core concept in a liberal democratic state and has become a central component of individual identity 
in this society. 58 It is by virtue of an individual’s citizenship status that the individual is an equal 
member of the political community.59 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is to 
theoretically prevent the states from treating disfavored groups as outsiders or from denying them 
“full inclusion in public life of the community.”60 It thus includes a sense of permanent inclusion in 
the American political community in a non-subordinate condition.61 Many believe that because 
equality and belonging are inseparably linked,62 acknowledging citizenship status confers full, 
complete, and equal belonging to the United States.63  
The above construction of citizenship suggests that all of the individuals born or naturalized 
in the society should be endowed with the right to be equals within that society.64 In fact, Madison’s 
53 Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 681, 691 (1997)
54 See, e. g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations And Rights of Citizens, 69 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1721 (2001).
55
 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); See also Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice 
and Injustice, 25 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 153 (2005); But see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
56 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 1193, 1262-84 (1992).
57 Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and Application of Birthright 
Citizenship in the United States,  9 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 667 (1995).
58 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1689, 1690 (2001).
59 Ruth E Gordon, Some Legal Problems With Trusteeship, 28 Cornell Int’l L. J. 301, 320-23 (1995).
60
 Eskridge, supra note 54, at 1721 (quoting KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: 
VISIONS OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993)).
61 Id. But see, Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 797 (2005) (arguing that, in reading the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court crafted a new kind of 
American territory, one who’s citizens could be governed temporarily and later be relinquished).
62
 Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race And Marginality, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 3 (1988)
63 Drimmer, supra note 57, at 667.  
64
 In a similar vein, President Clinton recently asked “[c]an we fulfill the promise of America by embracing all our 
citizens of all races…can we define what it means to be an American, not just in terms of the hyphen showing our 
ethnic origins but in terms of our primary allegiance to values America stands for.”  Remarks by President Clinton at 
University of California at San Diego commencement, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/initiatives/onamerica/1997061611894.htm 
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construction suggests that there should be no differences among the citizenry’s rights, despite 
differences in class or education.65 Recent declarations share those sentiments: "[i]n claiming 
citizenship, an individual - is first and foremost - asserting the existence of a social relationship 
between himself and others.  Specifically, a citizen is (by definition) someone who can properly 
claim the right to be treated as a fellow member of the political community."66 Thus, the Citizenship 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates only one class of United States citizen.67
Madison and the other authors of the Federalist Papers largely agreed.68 Accordingly, the term 
“American Citizen” is an expression of general principle that ought to govern membership in a free 
society and ought to confer equal rights.69
B. The Exclusionary Aspect 
Despite this focus on equality, both United States federal courts and Congress have either 
created or upheld levels or gradations of membership.  In addressing the concept’s classic 
constructions, historian J.G.A. Pocock observes that “[t]his account of human equality excludes the 
greater part of the human species from access to it.”70 Citizenship’s exclusionary aspect, though 
65
 Madison, supra note 41.
66
 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 74 (Yale University, 1980).  See also, 
Zietlow, supra note 44 at 731-32.
67
 Zietlow, supra note 44, at 731-32.  
68
 James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 421, 439 (1999).  See 
also, THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison) (“the door of this part of the Federal Government, is open to 
merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or 
wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith”).
69
 JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: 1608-1870 10 (1978).
70 J.G.A. Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times, 99 Queens Quarterly 1 (1992) (discussing the 
Greek origin of "classical" liberalism).
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containing substantial historical support, is largely unexplored in legal literature and decisions.71 Yet, 
the roots of citizenship’s dual nature are well established. 
For example, in Aristotle’s Politics, though in an passage he championed equality among 
members, the philosopher also observed: 
Is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic 
to be included?  If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizen, 
not every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for this 
man is a citizen. And if none of the lower class is citizens, in which 
part of the state are they to be placed?  
 
He later declares:
For [if these individuals]  are not resident aliens, and they are not 
foreigners . . . may we not so reply, that as far as this objection goes 
these in not more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding 
slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It 
must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens 
who are necessary to the existence of the state. 
. . .
Since there are many forms of government there must be many 
varieties of citizens and especially of citizens who are subjects.72 
Citizenship’s classical construction, as evinced in Aristotle’s works, equated the ideal of 
citizenship with virtue, in that “the good man and the good citizen are the same . . .”73 Virtue, in 
this case, was strictly reserved for those members of society who participated in the polity as 
“statesmen,” i.e., persons fit to hold political office.  Since polity participation was not a virtue 
present in all Athenian community members, not everyone was entitled to full citizenship.    
71 Saito, supra note 18 (arguing that the World War II Japanese internment was not aberrational, and that the United 
States is presently repeating the same mistake by "racing" Arab Americans as "terrorists"); Volpp, supra note 1
(arguing that post-9/11 United States culture treats individuals of Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim descent as racial 
minorities and accords them reduced respect and protection).
72 ARISTOTLE, supra note 31.
73 Id. Aristotle concedes this ideal is not possible, i.e., that every member of society be a virtuous person—the state 
is therefore imperfect, in that not every member can be a citizen.  He writes, “If the state cannot be entirely 
composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, 
still inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All 
must have the virtue of the good citizen—thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have the 
virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good.”  
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Even the actions of ancient Greek political leader Solon, who is attributed with creating 
Greek citizenship, created levels of participants in society in order to appease the wealthy.  Despite 
dramatically increasing the number of society members able to participate in political order, Solon 
maintained the dominance of large landholders by dividing the citizenry into four classes on the 
basis of wealth.74 In arguably the very first use of what was to be known as citizenship, Solon used 
differences based on land holdings to establish gradations of rights for the members of society, in 
this case, based on wealth.75 Thus, in ancient citizenship constructions, the capacity to rule was 
more a matter of status than of ability.76
Even Aristotle who at first presupposed a society of homogeneous free men, ultimately  
developed a theory based on hierarchy,77 in which a mechanic, for example, would be excluded from 
the ranks of citizens, in large part because such an individual typically has little interest in developing 
his mind.78 What results is that although the classic vision recognized that the state was a composite 
of its citizenship and that all citizens were equal, not all within a society were deserving of the status 
of citizen. 
The Roman Empire was the other civilization instrumental to citizenship’s classical 
construction.  Although Rome may not have produced as much well-known literature on the subject 
as did its Eastern counterpart, its great contribution lies in its grand application of the citizenship 
construct.  Due to the success of the Roman Empire, lasting effects of its expansion and influence, 
74 PETER RIESENBERG, CITIZENSHIP IN THE WESTERN TRADITION: PLATO TO ROUSSEAU 15 (North 
Carolina University Press, 1992). See also, James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 421, 429 (1999) (noting that Greeks developed a construction of citizenship that combined political 
participation in the polis with membership in the polity).
75
 JOSEPH A. ALMEIDA, JUSTICE AS AN ASPECT OF THE POLIS IDEA IN SOLON’S POLITICAL POEMS 
10-11 (Boston: Brill, 2003).  The first three classes of the society--requiring 500, 300, and 200 measures of produce 
from their land--were eligible to hold offices proportionate to their wealth; those with less than this wealth were 
members of the assembly and could serve as jurors.
76
 RIESENBERG, supra note 76, at 6.
77 Id. at 45.
78 Id.
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including the construction of citizenship as a concept, have affected almost every region of the 
world. 
Rome’s creation of a theory of universalism associated with citizenship is the great 
transformation of the concept.79 Rome eventually managed and ensured the growth of its empire on 
the basis of a form of universal citizenship of free men and a Stoic notion of universal brotherhood 
of mankind.80 In many respects, the universalism inherent in the Roman construction resembles the 
Greek construction’s egalitarian notions that extol the virtues of equality among the citizenry.  The 
Roman approach, perhaps due to the instrumental motivations of expansion, was far more inclusive 
than the Greek manifestations.  This is due, perhaps, to the Stoics’ development of Natural Law as 
the correct law of the nation and the world.  Although Rome could only pass laws of convention, 
the notion of being a citizen of the world, as well as a Roman citizen, was fostered by both Roman 
law and Stoic ideology.  The ideal nation-state was a universal nation-state.  The innovation of 
Rome’s citizenship ideal in the Natural Law context stems from the Roman people’s understanding 
of liberty, freedom from involuntary servitude, and freedom to exercise specific rights and to assume 
specific duties. Under this ideal of liberty, the Roman people were their own masters, free from 
internal domination by a monarch or by a political faction and free from subjection to any foreign 
power.  The Roman people were thus free to exercise their sovereignty, free to determine their 
destiny, and were free to follow those laws and customs that represented the Roman way of life.81 
As an individual, the citizen was free from the impositions of slavery; and was free from arbitrary 
exactions of fellow citizens, including magistrates.   He was free to enjoy a variety of rights: free to 
elect his own occupation, free to marry the woman of his choice, free to own slaves, and to 
79 Id. at 53.  But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 478 (1856) (Daniel, J., concurring).  Justice Daniel argued 
that the emancipation of a former slave, under Roman law, did not confer citizenship status on the slave.  Id.  He 
assumed the status of the “lower grades of domestic residents,” which were called “freedmen” in Rome.  Id.  Justice 
Daniel further noted that it was the decline of the Roman empire when citizenship rights were extended; this resulted 
in the “proud distinctions of the republic being gradually abolished”.  Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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dominate his wife and children.  As a citizen, he was free to participate in the assembly, free to vote, 
free to hold public office, and free to serve in the army.82
Despite this fervently egalitarian ideal, gradations of membership existed even in this 
model.83 For instance, by the fourth century, the plebeian class could hold a number of political 
positions, although they were still restricted from the higher rungs of political power.  After a bitter 
Samnite War also during this time period, Rome offered full citizenship rights to several former 
enemy towns, including Arica, but many Latin cities were granted a new kind of second-class or 
limited citizenship.84 The inhabitants of these Latin cities were granted legal and economic rights, 
but not full political ones.85 Subsequently, other examples of Rome’s struggles with citizenship 
gradations arose, such as the “conflict of the orders.”86 In this struggle between the patricians and 
plebeians, Rome eventually allowed wealthy plebeians a political voice and upward social mobility 
provided that they achieved military successes.87 Thus, in expanding her original tribal organization 
from four to thirty-five tribes, Rome maintained the fiction of political participation,88 but did not 
create an organization of equal tribes.  During this post-Dark Age and pre-Renaissance period, 
nation-states recognized the concept of citizenship, but equally recognized its component of 
gradations of membership.   
During this period, nation-states recognized the concept of citizenship, but with gradations 
of membership. Later Western civilizations followed suit.  Not unlike the classical Greek gradations, 
82
 J. RUFUS FEARS, "ANTIQUITY: THE EXAMPLE OF ROME” IN AN UNCERTAIN LEGACY: ESSAYS ON 
THE PURUSIT OF LIBERTY 7 (Edward B. McLean ed., Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1997).
83
 E.T. SALMON, ROMAN COLONIZATION UNDER THE REPUBLIC 117 (Cornell University Press, 1970).  
Some of these gradations were designated by community, its location, and relationship to Rome.  Id. at 40, 70.   In 
other instances, gradations affected individual non-Romans living within Italy.  Id. at 102, 117-18.   For example, 
citizenship was withheld from those who could not speak Latin, Id. at 149, while xenophobia and an “innate 
conviction of their own superiority” were demonstrated by the continuing expulsion of even enfranchised 
immigrants.  Id. at 102.
84
 Fears, supra note 84. 
85 Id.
86 Id. at 57.
87 Id. at 59-61.
88 Id. at 61.
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these early levels of citizenship were largely based on property ownership.  For example, in the 
fourteenth century, Pierre Jacobi writing on what can be described as municipal citizenship in 
France,89 acknowledged the concept of grades of membership.  For instance, the major pars was a 
group of decision-making citizens, but the citizens who made it up were not equally admitted to it, 
which introduced its own differentiation in the kind of citizenship each was granted.  This rule of 
exclusion was borne by women in particular, who were made ineligible to be participants within 
society.90 Sixteenth and seventeenth century citizenship in Bologna also recognized “grades of 
citizenship.”91 The sovereign recognized ranks within the citizenry, where nobles held the highest 
rank, and merchants—no matter how important—were ignoble, and correspondingly were among 
the lowest of ranks.92 Spain, within its own domestic arena as well as in its colonies, included levels 
of membership in its eighteenth century notion of citizenship.93 
C. The Modern Construction 
Contemporary domestic citizenship theory was significantly influenced by both the ancient 
and seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers.  It should therefore be of little surprise that 
the modern construction focuses on the equality component of the concept.   This domestic 
construction of citizenship, which is the theoretical bedrock of twentieth century citizenship studies, 
seems to refer not only to delineated rights but also to a broad concept of equal membership and 
89 Albert Rigaudiere, Municipal Citizenship in Pierre Jacobi’s Practica aurea libellorum, in PRIVILEGES AND 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP: LAW AND THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY 1 (Julius 
Kirshner and Laurent Mayali ed., 2002).
90 Id. at 10.
91 Angela de Benedicts, Citizenship, Government in Bologna (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries), in PRIVILEGES 
AND RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP: LAW AND THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY 127
(Juliu Kirshner and Laurent Mayali ed., 2002).
92 Id. at 129.
93 Tamar Herzog, Citizenship and Empire: Communal Definition in Eighteenth Century Spain and Spanish America, 
in PRIVILEGES AND RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP: LAW AND THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY 149-50 (Juliu Kirshner and Laurent Mayali ed., 2002).
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incorporation into the body politic.94 A correlative to this concept is a sense of belonging 
and participation in the community that is the nation.95 This last component, which contains both 
legal and conceptual aspects, demonstrates a psychological component of the term.  This 
construction suggests that the anointment of citizenship is an important title that goes to the heart 
of the individual's feeling of inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of the value and 
virtue of the democracy.96
Citizenship’s belonging or membership facet exhibits a subjective psychological or 
“imagined quality” to citizenship.97 The formal recognition of rights, as well as the imagined 
attributes of the status, demonstrates the importance in the construction of self for those within and 
outside the status classification.  These citizen attributes are supposed to define both who are the 
people in “We the People.”98 Michael Walzer observed that “[w]e who are already members do the 
choosing, in accordance to our understanding of what membership means in our community and of 
what sort of a community we want to have.”99 
When one considers the concept’s subjective or imagined qualities it may help explain why, 
despite the widely held belief that citizenship confers full membership and equality, these lofty goals 
are often not met for racial and ethnic minority and other marginalized groups.  Indeed, American 
history is replete with instances where bias takes the place of sound inclusive egalitarian theory and 
those who should be, or actually were provided with citizen status do not enjoy the benefits of 
94
 Ediberto Román, The Alien Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
1 (1998).
95 Id.
96 See CABRANES, supra note 61, at 5, n.12.
97
 BENEDICT R. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALIMS (1991). See also, Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, 
Constitutionalism, and Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 Hastings L.J. 331, 343 (2005) 
(“We know also from Benedict Anderson's work that culture and community are imagined, often in response to, in 
solidarity with, or in opposition to colonialism, trade, immigration, and other transnational projects.”).
98
 ERIC FONER, WHO OWNS HISTORY 80 (2003).
99
 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 32 (1983).
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citizenship.100   Though this tension concerning who are “the Americans” or who are “the People” 
can be aptly demonstrated by tracing the history of those who challenged their lesser citizenship 
status, the debate concerning this country’s national identity persists today.   For instance, Peter 
Brimelow’s 1995 book Alien Nation warned that non-white immigrants were destroying America’s 
“ethno-cultural community.”101 According to Brimelow, himself an Englishman, this American 
culture is grounded in a shared European ancestry.  More recently, Samuel Huntington questions 
whether the increasing multiculturalism in the United States will disintegrate into the type of ethnic 
strife that destroyed Yugoslavia.102 
Irrespective of whether one is willing to accept these recent ethnocentric opinions, this 
country has repeatedly used the citizenship construct in exclusionary ways.103  Indeed, one leading 
citizenship scholar recently observed that with respect to immigrants, indigenous people, and the 
inhabitants of the island colonies, the Supreme Court cases establishing the rights of those groups 
established “a vision of the United States as . . . a nation that defined itself in ethno-racial terms as 
Anglo-Saxon.”104 Many, such as African-Americans, Latinos and Latinas, Asians, and Arab-
Americans, would argue that they have existed in an anomalous status by holding the title of citizen 
100
 Such benefits relate to certain fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, to serve on juries, protection of laws, 
just to name a few.  See, e,g,, Vikram David Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin To Voting, 80 
Cornell L. Rev. 203 (1995).  This also suggests that citizenship is subjective and is to be applied depending upon 
whether the collective psyche believes an individual or group deserves the status.  As Michael Walzer observed, “we 
who are already members do the choosing, in accordance with our own understanding of what membership means in 
our community and of what sort of a community we want to have.” WALZER, supra note 101, at 32. Accordingly, 
when the citizenry, through their officials, decide on membership, “whether like us or not we have to consider them 
as well as ourselves.”  Id.
101
 PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION 
DISASTER 1 (Random House, 1995). But see, Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Dispair: Legisprudential 
and Historic Perspectives on the Agjobs Bill of 2003, 42 Harv. J. on Legis. 417, 474 (2005) (noting that xenophobic 
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 Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity In A Mutl-icultural Nation: The Challenge of Immigration 
Law and Immigrants, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1347 (2005) (surveying Samuel Huntington’s book, Who Are We? The 
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103 Aleinikoff, supra note 58, at 1690.
104 Id. at 1692.  “By defining insiders, the concept of citizenship necessarily defines outsiders; and by guaranteeing 
full and equal rights for those within the charmed circle it supports fewer rights--or at least less attention--for those 
outside the circle.”
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yet enjoying less than full membership status.  Whereas ancient societies like Greece formally 
recognized inferior groups, such as “metics” or “freedmen;” modern citizenship theory does not 
seem to support inferior classes of citizens. Irrespective of whether one accepts the suggestion that 
there are levels of citizenship, federal decisions have, at best, been slow in granting full rights to all 
those holding citizenship status, particularly with respect to racial and ethnic minorities.                     
 As demonstrated above, the focus of the domestic literature on the modern constructions 
of citizenship emphasize equality and inclusion.  Although the modern theory of citizenship extols 
the virtues of equality as much as the ancients did, the modern practice denies equality to many 
members within society.  While in ancient times the gradations were largely based upon wealth and 
gender, in the heterogeneous society that became the United States, the gradations also manifest 
themselves in terms of race and ethnicity.105 
Little of the modern discourse of democracy or citizenship would question the concept of 
equality, let alone accept levels of membership.   Indeed, the United States Congress, as well as the 
Supreme Court, has repeatedly addressed the importance of the citizen in a democracy, but has 
never openly admitted to endorsing levels of inclusion.106 In analyzing arguably the most significant 
twentieth century citizenship decisions—Afroyim v. Rusk and Reid v. Covert,107 one can fairly easily 
conclude that by defining insiders, citizenship necessarily defines outsiders, and by guaranteeing full 
and equal rights for those within the charmed circles it supports fewer rights—or at least less 
attention—for those outside it.108 
105
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (recognizing a woman’s right to suffrage).
106 See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the government 
had no power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under a statute that provided that a citizen should lose his citizenship 
for voting in political election in a foreign state); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that the provisions of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice that extend court-martial jurisdiction to persons accompanying the armed 
forces outside of the continental limits of the United States could not be constitutionally applied to the trial of 
civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas, in times of peace, for capital offenses).
107 Id.
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The domestic creation of membership levels is a result of using legal fictions to create 
subordinate rights.  In fact, the role that constructions of subordination, including national origin 
and race, have played in excluding members from the United States’ body politic, at the very least, 
calls into question the sincerity of the egalitarian citizenship rhetoric.  In fact, historically full 
birthright citizenship, as well as citizenship through naturalization, the other primary means of 
attaining membership, were attainable goals for those not considered to be racial minorities, but 
remained elusive or illusory for other classifications of minorities.    
American citizenship unfortunately has all too often been a tool for including Caucasians 
and excluding African-Americans,109 indigenous peoples,110 and other non-whites.111 For instance, 
the legal doctrines created over a century ago to maintain African-American slave status112 and to 
deport and exclude legal immigrants, such as the plenary powers, still maintain an inferior citizenship 
status in law for the inhabitants of this country’s island colonies, as well as the indigenous people of 
this land, as well as a de facto subordinate status of other minorities such as African-Americans.    
Despite this reality, the central concept of citizenship in the United States Constitution is not 
based on inequality but equality.  The primary source for citizenship within this country, the 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a post-reconstruction amendment specifically 
aimed to provide former slaves, i.e., African-Americans, the political rights associated with 
citizenship.  Although this clause centers on the notion of equality among the citizenry, in practice, 
109 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 481-82 (1856) (holding that African Americans are not citizens as 
contemplated by the federal or state constitutions).
110 See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. Rep. 693, 712 (1822) (holding that Indians are not citizens, but are distinct 
tribes or nations).
111 Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over The “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and 
Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 Yale L.  Pol’y Rev. 427 (2002).
112 See Abel A. Bartley, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Great Equalizer of the American People, 36 Akron L. 
Rev. 473, 481 (2003).  Despite adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, most former slaves found their status little 
changed.  While the amendment ensured that humans would no longer be considered property, it did not grant 
equality.  Institution of “Black Codes” in many states “returned the belief in subhumans and restored the idea of 
human chattel.…Collectively, the ‘Black codes’ were intended to reduce the status of African Americans to a level 
just above slavery and to demolish thoughts of racial equality.” 
24
citizens, particularly those of color, have been repeatedly denied the benefits of equal treatment.113 
Many of the inconsistencies in treatment with respect to this group stem from century-old 
constitutional doctrines that gave the political branches of government complete or plenary power 
over these groups and established disparate treatment for the less favored citizens.114 Those over 
whom the United States government exercises complete power were in effect deemed by that same 
government to be not true citizens, but in actuality the “outsiders.”115  
Much of the disparate domestic treatment of these inferior members of society derives from 
century-old constitutional doctrines that are based on xenophobic, nativist, and racist sentiments.  
For some, the exclusionary nature of citizenship evinces a relationship between governments and 
the governed that can always be dissolved.116 
In the 1800’s the United States Supreme Court began articulating a doctrine that formally 
113
 As Justice Ginsberg noted in her dissent in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), numerous 
instances of unequal treatment “ . . . reflective of a system of racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our 
workplaces, markets and neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes, qualifications, and interview styles 
still experience different receptions, depending on their race. White and African-American consumers still encounter 
different deals. People of color looking for housing still face discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate 
agents, and mortgage lenders. Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they are the low 
bidders, and they are sometimes refused work even after winning contracts. Bias both conscious and unconscious, 
reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity 
and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.” Id. at 273-74 (references 
omitted).
114 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 481-82 (1856) (holding that African Americans are not citizens as 
contemplated by the federal or state constitutions); Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. Rep. 693, 712 (1822) (holding that 
Indians are not citizens, but are distinct tribes or nations); Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over The 
“Other”: International Law, 20 Yale L. Pol’y Rev. 427 (2002);  Abel A. Bartley, The Fourteenth Amendment: The 
Great Equalizer of the American People, 36 Akron L. Rev. 473, 481 (2003). Despite adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, most former slaves found their status little changed. While the amendment ensured that humans would 
no longer be considered property, it did not grant equality. Institutions of “Black Codes” in many states “returned 
the belief in sub-humans and restored the idea of human chattel . . . Collectively, the ‘Black codes’ were intended to 
reduce the status of African Americans to a level just above slavery and to demolish thoughts of racial equality.” 
Never changed since the adoption of the Constitution is the clause giving Congress “… Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . 
” U.S. Const. Art IV §3. American Indians have long been subject to plenary powers of the United States, variously 
attributed to the Constitution’s war powers (Art. I § 8), treaty powers (Art. II § 2) and commerce clauses (Art. I § 8). 
Lawrence Baca, “The Legal Status of American Indians,” in Volume 4 HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS 
230, 231 (Smithsonian, 1988).  Finally, while the Thirteenth Amendment superseded the U.S. Const. Art. IV § 2 
requirement that slaves be returned to their owners, as noted earlier, it did not grant equality to persons of color, 
hence facilitating adoption of Jim Crow laws in several states, which were ratified by the famous doctrine of 
“separate but equal” in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
115
 Saito, supra, note 113.
116
 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53 (1975).
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subordinated certain groups by allowing the government’s “political” branches so-called “plenary 
power” to discriminate against indigenous peoples, inhabitants of the United States’ colonial 
possessions, and immigrants.   The Supreme Court has defined plenary as a full or complete power, 
causing courts to defer to Congress when faced with challenges to official conduct.117 The doctrine 
was and continues to be used as a weapon to disenfranchise those groups universally recognized as 
the most vulnerable.118 The plenary power doctrine and a similar one applied to African-Americans,  
forms the central constitutional doctrine that  supports the disenfranchisement of millions of 
Americans.  The disparate treatment of these groups provokes this criticism concerning the 
citizenship jurisprudence’s rhetoric concerning equality. 
The period from the second decade of the nineteenth century to the second decade of the 
twentieth century is the significant juridical period when the Supreme Court and Congress attempted 
to define what groups were true American citizens.119 The eventual habitual response to this 
question by both the United States Supreme Court, as well as the United States Congress, was that 
each and every statistically significant racial minority group was excluded from full citizenship 
status.120 Between 1823 and 1922 the United States Supreme Court, consistent with the classical 
constructions of the construct, iterated the importance of citizenship in a democracy, but endorsed a 
model of differentiated levels of membership.  In a series of decisions dealing with immigration, 
national security, and overseas expansion, the Court endorsed the unequal treatment and inferior 
status of various groups that should have been considered citizens.  These cases include the 
117 See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding a law that subjected Indians to federal law as
valid and constitutional; being within the limits of the United States, they are subject to acts of Congress).
118
 Saito, supra note 113, at 427.
119 Id. at 37-47.  Despite the likely assumption that the English doctrine of jus soli (one who is born within a nation’s 
jurisdiction is a citizen of the country) would govern citizenship rights in America, the United States did not apply 
this doctrine to racial minorities.  Any doubts about these exclusions were clarified in the Dred Scott decision which 
held that blacks could not be citizens, even if free persons—a rule until the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
120 See id. at 49-77.  Even though after 1870 naturalization was open also to blacks, in only one case did a petitioner 
for citizenship even attempt to assert a claim other than on the basis of being “white.” See, e.g., IAN HANEY 
LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (New York University Press, 1996)
26
infamous Dred Scott121 and Plessy v. Ferguson122 decisions with respect to African Americans; Elk v. 
Wilkins,123 United States v. Kagama,124 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock125 with respect to indigenous peoples; 
the Chinese Exclusion Cases126 with respect to Asian immigrants; and the Insular Cases127 with respect to 
the inhabitants of the island conquests.   In each of these decisions, racial and ethnic minority 
groups challenged the propriety of governmental action that discriminated against them.  In each 
decision, the Court used similar racial and xenophobic justifications to uphold the disparate 
treatment.   With the exception of the treatment of African-Americans, the constitutional 
justification to support such unequal treatment was the plenary powers doctrine under which  courts  
deferred to the political branches of government, when certain groups challenged the violation of 
their constitutional rights. 
The plenary powers doctrine, essentially deriving from what was first developed as the 
inherent powers doctrine, was developed in the late nineteenth century, during this country’s 
colonial expansion.   Beginning in 1822, the Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s 
doctrine of inherent plenary powers over the indigenous people of this land, the inhabitants of the 
island colonies, and immigrants in entry and exclusion proceedings.  The decisions that established 
121 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
122 163 U. S. 537 (1896) (holding that a statute requiring railroads carrying passengers to provide equal but separate 
accommodations for white or colored races was constitutional).
123 112 U. S. 94 (1884) (holding that an Indian born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United States, 
which still exists and is recognized as a tribe by the government of the United States, who has voluntarily separated 
himself from his tribe and taken up his residence among the white citizens of a state, but who has not been 
naturalized or taxed or recognized as a citizen, either by the United States or by the state, is not a citizen of the 
United States, within the Fourteenth Amendment).
124 118 U. S. 375 (1886).
125 187 U. S. 553, 565 (1903) (holding that Congress may pass laws that are in conflict with treaties made with the 
Indians).
126
 These cases grew out of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prevented immigration of Chinese laborers.  
Act of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat. 58).  Upon its original sunset, the law was expanded ten years later to tighten all 
immigration and travel from China.  Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States of May 
1892 (27 Stat. 25).  National Archives and Records Administration, Chinese Immigration and the Chinese in the 
United States, available at http://www.archives.gov/locations/finding-aids/chinese-immigration.html
127
 The Insular Cases, several separate opinions during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century, determined 
the status and applicability of the United States Constitution to territories, facilitating U.S. imperialism without 
granting full citizenship rights to territorial residents.  For a revisionist view of the doctrine established by the cases, 
see Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion And Territorial Annexation, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797 
(2005).
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and first applied the plenary powers doctrine to various outsider groups included:  United States v. 
Kagama,128 Chae Chan Ping v. United States,129 Jones v. United States130 In re Ross,131 Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States,132 Fong Yue Ting v. United States,133 Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,134 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,135 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,136 De Lima v. Bidwell,137 Downes v. Bidwell,138 Goetze v. United States,139 Dooley v. 
United States,140 The Diamond Rings,141 Hawaii v. Mankichi,142 Kepner v. United States,143 Dorr v. United 
States,144 Huus v. Porto [sic] Rico S.S. Co.,145 Balzac v. Porto [sic] Rico.146 
In each of the above cases, the United States Supreme Court concluded that even the most 
basic liberty protections, as a matter of a constitutional law, did not apply to these groups.  The 
128 118 U. S. 375 (1886).
129 130 U. S. 581 (1889) (holding that Congress has power, even in times of peace, to exclude aliens from, or prevent 
their return to, the United States, for any reason it may deem sufficient).
130 137 U. S. 202 (1890) (holding that Congress can pass legislation concerning Guano Islands discovered by citizens 
of the U.S., and to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to such islands).
131 140 U. S. 651 (1892).
132 142 U. S. 651 (1892) (declaring constitutional an act by Congress that provides for the exclusion from admission 
into the United States of certain classes of aliens).
133 149 U. S. 698 (1893) (reaffirming that the power to exclude or to expel aliens is vested in the political 
departments of the government).
134 174 U. S. 445 (1899) (stating that the lands of the Cherokee Nation are not held in individual ownership, but are 
public lands, held for the equal benefit of all the members).
135 187 U. S. 294 (1902) (holding that full administrative power is was possessed by Congress over Indian tribal 
property).
136 187 U. S. 553 (1903).
137 182 U. S. 1 (1901) (holding that upon the ratification of the treaty with Spain, Porto [sic] Rico ceased to be a 
foreign country and became a territory of the U.S., and that duties were no longer collectible upon merchandise 
brought from that island).
138 182 U. S. 244 (1901) (holding that because Porto [sic] Rico was not a part of the U.S. for purposes of Article 1, 
section  8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress can impose a duty on goods shipped from Porto [sic] Rico to the U.S.).
139 182 U. S. 221 (1901) (holding that Hawaii and Porto [sic] Rico were not foreign countries for purposes of the 
tariff laws of the United States).
140 183 U. S. 141 (1901) (holding that on the cession of Porto [sic] Rico to the United States, the U.S. could no 
longer levy duties on goods shipped from the U.S. into Puerto Rico).
141 183 U. S. 176 (1901) (holding that the Philippines, after their cession to the U.S. by Spain, was not a foreign 
country for purposes of the tariff laws of the U.S.).
142
 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (accepting the cession made by the Republic of Hawaii, and continuing the municipal 
legislation of the islands, not contrary to the U.S. Constitution, until Congress should otherwise determine).
143 195 U. S. 100 (1904)  (holding that because Congress had enacted a statutory Bill of Rights for the Philippines 
that prohibited double jeopardy, such provision barred an appellate court from finding a criminal defendant guilty 
after acquittal by trial court).
144 195 U. S. 138 (1904)  (stating that the right of trial by jury was not extended by the federal constitution, without 
legislation and of its own force, to the Philippine Islands).
145 182 U.S. 392 (1901) (holding that ports in Porto [sic] Rico were ports within the U.S. for purposes of the U.S. 
coastwise laws).
146 258  U. S. 298 (1922) (the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply to territories belonging to the 
U.S. that have not been incorporated into the Union).
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Court based its holdings on international law principles and found that because the government’s 
political branch was primarily responsible for national security, issues that touched upon the status 
of individuals from sovereigns within and without the physical boundaries of the United States 
should be addressed primarily by the political branch of government, Congress, and not the judicial 
branch.  The view that ultimately became the plenary powers doctrine evolved over a series of 
decisions that purportedly based their determinations upon national security, but also contained 
racist, as well as xenophobic, foundations.  
The doctrine is perhaps more widely recognized in the immigration area and was first 
developed in the immigration setting in the so-called Chinese Exclusion Cases. In Chae Chan Ping, the 
Court in 1889 upheld the exclusion of legal Chinese residents, and concluded that courts would not 
interfere with the government’s action because it derived from the government’s authority over 
national security.147 Three years later, in 1892 in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court upheld an 
exclusion of a Japanese immigrant without a hearing,148 invoking the “accepted maxim of 
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential 
to self-preservation to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only 
in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”149 As it subsequently 
explained in the 1936 decision of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,150 the theory of inherent 
plenary powers was premised essentially upon concerns over international law principles that 
recognized a nation-state as having the inherent power to take its place among the sovereign nations 
of the world despite being a government of limited and enumerated powers.151 
147 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 582.
148 Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. 651.
149 Id. at 659.
150 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936) (“The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain 
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have 
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”).
151 Id.
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III. Subordinates in Law
The use of the plenary powers doctrine and other similar ones with respect to African-
Americans created gradations of members within this society.  The constructions of membership 
levels have resulted in subordinate rights and created two types of subordinate member groups 
within the political structure of a society. 
The first group includes those who are subordinate in law, who derive their membership not 
from the Fourteenth Amendment, but from the inherent powers of the political branches of 
government and the Territorial Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution.152 This 
group includes indigenous people and the territorial island people.  There can be little question 
concerning the subordinate nature of their rights.  The United States Congress has plenary or total 
power to govern them, including the ability to nullify any local laws, and may enact federal 
legislation that it deems appropriate.  Although all indigenous people, as well as the inhabitants born 
on the overseas island territories, are United States citizens (nationals in the case of Samoans), they 
hold a very different and an inferior kind of citizenship. 
The second group includes those who may be subordinate members in fact.  This 
classification is far more controversial because this group’s members are Fourteenth Amendment 
citizens, and yet their treatment, after their formal grant of citizenship, raises questions whether in 
fact they are equal members of society.   Members of this group may include African-Americans and 
other racial and ethnic minorities.   
We will first examine the de jure subordinates, including this land’s indigenous peoples and 
this country’s island territories inhabitants.  The focus will then shift to the de facto group of 
subordinates, who are less equal than other American citizens. 
152
 In many respects, the inherent powers doctrine is at the forefront of political debates today.  For instance, in 
response to the recent disclosure of the government’s use of domestic wiretaps without court approval, the executive 
department has argued that the Constitution gives the President the inherent authority to for such actions by virtue of 
his position as commander-in-chief.
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A. The Indigenous People 
If the primary means to attain United States citizenship is to be born on United States soil, 
indigenous peoples, because they are indigenous, should have been accordingly considered citizens.  
They, however, were excluded.   Their disenfranchised status stems from the plenary powers 
doctrine.153 As mentioned, this doctrine is premised on the notion that the political branches of the 
federal government are responsible for the nation’s security and for its relations with other 
sovereigns.154 Since indigenous tribes were seen as part of sovereign nations within the United 
States, the doctrine was applied to them in a variety of ways.  Paradoxically, a doctrine premised 
upon the authority of the political branches of the government to protect the people of the United 
States from a foreign enemy was used to justify the continued subjugation and mistreatment of the 
original inhabitants of this land.  Thus, the original inhabitants of the United States were deemed a 
potential foreign threat from within the United States.    
The plenary power of Congress over the indigenous nations stems from a series of Supreme 
Court decisions that began in 1823.155 The doctrine endorsed the repeated abuse of these peoples’ 
rights, including the continuous breaches of treaties they entered into with the United States 
government and theft of their inhabiting lands.156 In membership terms, within the United States 
the doctrine justified the Supreme Court’s imposition of limited membership rights for the 
153
 For a brief history and analysis of this doctrine and its application with American Indians, see VINE DELORIA, 
JR. & DAVID WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, & CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 21-31 (University of 
Texas Press, 1999) (this book offers a full historical analysis of the relationship between the United States 
Constitution and Indians).  
154 Saito, supra note 113, at 436 (discussion of how the plenary powers doctrine has been asserted over Indians and 
other immigrants).
155 See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE 
MASKING OF JUSTICE 25-27, 45 (University of Texas Press, 1997) (this book discusses fifteen landmark cases 
where the United States Supreme Court truncated Indian human rights). See also, DELORIA AND WILKINS, 
supra note 155, at 29.
156 See generally, DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (Hold Rinehart, 1972) (giving 
eyewitness accounts of the U.S. government’s attempts to acquire Native Americans’ land by using threats, 
deception, and murder); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES (Dell Publishing 
Co., 1974) (raising questions about the status of Native Americans within the political landscapes); GLORIA 
JAHODA, THE TRAIL OF TEARS (Random, 1975) (describes how white settlers forced Indian tribes of plains).
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indigenous people.  Perhaps more importantly, at the same time the doctrine justified the continued 
use of racist stereotypes to maintain paternalistic “wardship” over the indigenous people that 
typically resulted in the theft of their land and other rights.157 Chief Justice John Marshall described 
the attitude of that era: “[t]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose 
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.  To leave them in 
possession of their country was to leave the country a wilderness.”158 In 1823, the case of Johnson v. 
McIntosh, the Court began developing what was going to become the doctrine justifying the taking of 
indigenous lands by looking to the international law principle of discovery,159 which gave the first 
Western power to “discover” new lands the exclusive right to that land against other Western 
powers and the power “to acquir[e] the soil from the natives, and [establish] settlements upon it.”160 
In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall seemed to recognize the indigenous peoples’ sovereignty, 
declaring that the United States government “manifestly consider[s] the several Indian nations as 
distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is 
exclusive.”161 This notion of sovereignty was soon unmasked in United States v. Rogers, where the 
Supreme Court rejected a claim that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in a reservation.162 
157 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1990).
158
 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823) (“The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the 
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon 
it. It was a right with which no European could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the 
assertion of which, by others, all asserted.”).
159 See Utter, supra note 12. See also, VINE DELORIA, JR., AND CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN 
INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2-6 (University of Texas Press, 1983); DELORIA AND WILKINS, supra note 
155, at 4-5; WILKINS, supra note 157, at 31-32.
160 Id. See also VINE DELORIA, JR., OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH 6-37 (Straight Arrow Books, 1971); Utter, 
supra note 12.
161
 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832) (holding  that the state of Georgia did not have the right to redraw 
boundary lines negotiated by treaty between the Indian tribes and Congress).
162
 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846) (holding that Congress may, by law, punish any offense committed 
in a territory occupied by the Indians and not within the limits of any state).
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The next series of decisions in 1831, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,163 also known as the Cherokee 
cases, involved the Cherokee Nation’s effort to halt the State of Georgia’s attempt to seize Cherokee 
land.  In dismissing the Cherokees’ claim, the Court found the indigenous territory was part of a 
domestic dependent nation that the United States nonetheless held title to, irrespective of the 
Cherokee’s will.164 Professor Sarah Cleveland recently observed that the decision not only crippled 
the Cherokee Nation’s ability to sue in United States courts, it placed the indigenous people “in a 
‘no-man’s land’ status of being neither citizens of the United States nor aliens of sovereign foreign 
state.”165 This language makes it clear that as early as 1831 the United States Supreme Court 
implicitly created an alien-citizen paradox applicable to this country’s indigenous people.166 In this 
paradoxical state, the individuals within this group are neither full citizens with all the rights 
associated with the status nor are they completely foreign because they have some form of 
citizenship.167 
The subordinate as well as paradoxical status of the indigenous people was further 
confirmed in the 1884 case of Elk v. Wilkins.168 John Elk, an indigenous person, renounced his tribal 
membership, became a Nebraska resident, and sought to register to vote.169 The State of Nebraska 
rejected Elk’s application because he was not a citizen despite the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.170 The Elk Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment established that 
citizenship was available only to persons who at birth were completely subject to United States 
163 30 U. S. 1 (1831) (holding that an Indian tribe within the United States was not a foreign state within the meaning 
of the Constitution).
164 Id.
165 Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent In Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century 
Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
166 See, e.g., Román, supra note 96. In this work, the author examines the anomalous second-class citizenship of the 
inhabitants of Puerto Rico, who hold a status with attributes of both citizen and foreigner.
167 Id.
168 112 U. S. 94 (1886)  (holding that if Native Americans born within the United States had not been neutralized and 
had not become a citizen through any treaty or statute, these Native Americans were not citizens within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
169 Id.
170 Id.
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jurisdiction.171 Because indigenous nations were “distinct political communities” “within the 
territorial limits of the United States,” they were not completely subject to United States jurisdiction.  
Noting the exclusive as well as exclusionary nature of United States citizenship, the Court concluded 
“no one can become a citizen of a nation without its consent” and because indigenous people 
“form[ed] no part of the people entitled to representation,” they “were never deemed citizens.”172 
Thus, even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States courts 
continued to struggle with indigenous peoples’ citizenship rights.173 Despite Elk’s being born in an 
America before the Americans had “discovered” America, the Elk decision established that the 
indigenous people of America were treated as wards of the United States’ Anglo-Saxon majority. 
The United States has always viewed these people, despite being born in the United States, as 
different from full or first-class citizens.174 Even after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the 
Supreme Court concluded that indigenous peoples were not citizens by birthright.  In an effort to 
protect the perception of what was an American, courts became resolute in not diluting citizenship 
with that which was perceived to be an inferior class of people.  The government used the pretext 
that indigenous peoples were part of a “distinct political community” within the United States, and 
they had never engaged in the social compact to swear allegiance to this country.175 Indeed, the 
subordination of indigenous peoples in decisions such as Johnson v. McIntosh,176 facilitated the 
alternative models of subordinate citizens.  This in turn facilitated the Dred Scott decision as well as 
other subordination, such as people of color seeking to be naturalized and the inhabitants of this 
country’s overseas colonial conquests.  
171 Id.
172 See Cleveland, supra note 167, at 57 (quoting Elk v. Wilkins).
173 See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongweghoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the 
Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 Harv. Black Letter L.J.  107 (1999).
174 See DELORIA AND WILKINS, supra note 155, at vii-xi.
175 Jackson v. Goodell, 20 Johns. Rep. 693, 712 (“Though born within our territorial limits, the Indians are 
considered as born under the jurisdiction of their tribes.  They are not our subjects, born within the purview of the 
law, because they are not born in obedience to us.”).
176 Id.
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Shortly after the United Sates government considered indigenous people to be something 
other than citizens, the government entered into treaties with tribes in order to maintain a 
relationship that would purportedly afford each side a sense of sovereignty.177 Not long after the 
euphemism of sovereignty was established and treaties were entered into, the United States 
government ceased to use treaties and simply “told the indigenous peoples what they could and 
could not do, and where they could do it.”178 In large part because indigenous peoples were viewed 
as part of their own sovereign tribes and were subject to tribal laws, the United States took the 
position that the indigenous people could be dismissed as a separate people living in certain sections 
of America that could be controlled without any recourse on their part.179 
Eventually, the complete disregard for indigenous peoples gave way to compromises to 
another form of subordinate citizenship.  The process of granting United States citizenship to 
indigenous peoples came in steps and occurred over a considerable period of time.  The first step 
was the grant of citizenship as an “incentive” to remove these people to the West.180 Thus, some 
early treaties between the Indian Nations and the United States provided for the attainment of 
citizenship.181 Congress then began to grant citizenship to certain tribes through legislation.182 Other 
efforts were made via treaty with Mexico in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which the Pueblo 
Indians were deemed United States citizens by their failure to “choose” Mexican citizenship.183 Yet 
another step was through the Allotment Act, where indigenous peoples were granted citizenship 
177 Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians, With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1461, 1462 (1991).
178 Id. at 1480. “In fact, Thomas Jefferson stated: [W]e shall with great pleasure see your people become disposed to 
cultivate the earth, to raise herds or useful animals and to spin and weave, for their food and clothing . . . We will 
with pleasure furnish you with implements for the most necessary arts and with persons who many instruct how to 
make and use them.”
179 Id.
180 Porter, supra note 175, at 111.
181 Id. (citing Treaty with the Cherokee, July 8, 1817, art. 8, 7 Stat. 1256; Treaty with the Cherokee, Feb.  
with Ottowa, June 24, 1862, art. 4, 12 Stat. 1237, 1238; Treaty with the Seneca, Mixed Seneca, Shawnee, Quapaw, 
Etc., Feb 23, 1867, art. 13, 17, 28, 15 Stat. L. 513). 
182 Id. at 112 (citing Act of March 3, 1843, S. Stat. 647 which naturalized the Stockbridge Tribe).
183 Id.
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upon issuance of an allotment.184 With the passage of the 1924 Indian American Citizenship Act, 
the United States government imposed a form of citizenship on all indigenous peoples and declared 
them to have concurrent citizenship with their respective tribes.185 By 1924, indigenous peoples 
could become United States citizens through legislation, treaty, allotment, and a patent in fee simple 
by adopting the habits of civilized life.186 
Their membership’s subordinate nature was premised on notions of inferiority.  The group 
was characterized as existing in a state of “ignorance and mental debasement.”187 The Supreme 
Court, in United States v. Ritchie,188 declared “[f]rom their degraded condition . .  . and ignorance 
generally, the privileges extended to them in the administration of the government must have been 
limited; and they still, doubtless, required its fostering care and protection.”189 Subsequently, in 1909 
the United States Supreme Court confirmed their limited nature of citizenship. In United States v. 
Celestine, the Court held that granting citizenship to “Indians” did not grant them the “privileges and 
immunities” of United States citizens.190 In the 1913 case of United States v. Sandoval, the Court 
similarly concluded that “citizenship [was] not in itself an obstacle to the exercise by Congress of its 
power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians.”191 In continuing to portray 
these people in a demeaning manner, Justice Van Devanter observed that “as a superior and 
civilized nation,” the United States was obligated to protect “all dependent Indian communities 
184 Id. at 120.
185 Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U. S. C. § 1401(2); see also, generally, Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: 
Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1615 (2000).
186 Id. at 123.
187 Goodell, 20 Johns, at 720.
188 United States v. Ritchie, 58 U. S. 525 (1854) (holding that the title of the land to the purchaser in the purchaser’s 
petition to the board of commissioners setting forth his claim to the land against the government and others is 
confirmed).
189 Id. at 540.
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within its borders,”192 and this was particularly appropriate in that case because Pueblo people were 
an “ignorant” and “degraded” people.193 In 1916 the same Justice in United States v. Nice concluded 
that “citizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued guardianship, and so may be 
conferred without completely emancipating the Indians or placing them beyond the reach of 
congressional regulations adopted for their protection.”194 Professor Robert Porter recently observed 
that “Indians today have the status of a minor--acknowledged as citizens but not fully recognized as 
being able to care for one’s own affairs.”195 They are United States citizens simply because they have 
been born on American soil, but they are regarded as being part of their tribal communities and are 
afforded rights and immunities subject to their tribal governments.196 
The application of the plenary powers doctrine constitutionalized the inferior citizenship 
status of indigenous people and as Professor Saito observed in practical terms, resulted in Indian 
nations losing 90 million acres of reservation land, more than two-thirds of their former holdings.197 
B. The Territorial Island Inhabitants 
The plenary powers doctrine is also the basis for the subordination of island inhabitants who 
were colonized after the Spanish-American War and World War II.198 For this group, the United 
States Supreme Court used the plenary powers doctrine to avoid extending them constitutional 
protections.  In the period’s major public policy debate, the Court in the leading Insular Case 
decision Downes v. Bidwell199 concluded that the Constitution did not “follow the flag.” “The power to 
acquire territory by treaty,” Justice Brown affirmed, “implied not only the power to govern such 
192 Id. at 46.
193 Id.
194 United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916) (Congress had the power to regulate or prohibit the sale of 
intoxicating liquor to such Indians).
195 Porter, supra note 175, at 153.
196 Id.
197 Saito, supra note 113, at 441.
198 Román, Alien-Citizen, supra note 96, at 1.
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territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what 
their status shall be in what Chief Justice Marshall termed the ‘American Empire.’”200 In sum, the 
plenary power of Congress arose from the inherent right to acquire territory, and the Territorial 
Clause (of the Constitution) endorsed the United States’ treaty-making power, and the power to 
declare and conduct war in other lands.  The Constitution applied to the territories only to the 
degree that it was extended to them by Congress.201 As a result, for this group there has never been 
any pretense concerning the Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability or equality for that matter.202 
These individuals did not receive citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment, the vehicle used 
to grant or impose such status on virtually all other groups who have attained it.  They became 
associated with the United States by being inhabitants of lands conquered by the United States.  As 
acquired in this manner, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Territorial Clause 
in Article IV of the Constitution, and not the Fourteenth Amendment, determined the rights of this 
group.203 As interpreted, this provision endowed Congress with complete or plenary power over 
these people.204 In turn, the Court and Congress have kept this group in a subordinate and 
disenfranchised status. 
The island people who exist under United States’ control but are not full members of the 
body politic, reside in the island groups of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall 
Islands, and the Republic of Palau. 205 These island groups examined here fall under two categories: 
200 Id.
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205 See e.g., Ediberto Roman, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND 
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the first are the unincorporated United States territories, and the second are the newly created 
sovereign, yet dependent, island groups of the South Pacific.  The islands of Puerto Rico, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and American Samoa are so-
called unincorporated territories.206 These island groups are dependent lands that the United States 
Supreme Court, in a series of decisions known as the Insular Cases, concluded were neither 
“foreign” countries nor “part of the United States.”207 The unincorporated territories, undoubtedly 
should be classified as those existing under a colonial regime because: the United States Congress 
has plenary or complete power to govern the territories, including the ability to nullify local laws and 
enact federal legislation dictating the rights of the inhabitants of those territories; none of the 
territories are fully incorporated as a state of the union or are sovereign nations; and although all 
inhabitants born on the territories are United States citizens (nationals in the case of Samoans), they 
do not enjoy similar rights as citizens on the mainland and have no voting representation in the 
federal government.208 These last colonial indicia ensures that the island inhabitants do not receive 
the same amount of aide or other government largess provided to similarly situated citizens on the 
mainland, nor do these people have the ability to vote for President, Vice-President, or any member 
of Congress.  The second category of islands include: The Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. In international circles, they are 
considered to be autonomous nation-states but are included herein because of their similar history 
of annexation and the existing issues concerning their sovereignty.209 
The territories of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau were formally United States’ 
dependencies and still are largely controlled by the United States. In fact, the United States federal 
agency responsible for administering the United States’ territories, the Office of Insular Affairs, 
206 Id.
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identifies the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated State of Micronesia, and the Republic 
of Palau as being under the jurisdiction of the United States.  Despite the international perception of 
sovereignty stemming from labels such as “Republics,” or “Federated State,” the Office of Insular 
Affairs website classifies these lands as territories where the United States maintains the 
responsibility for administering and providing assistance.210 In essence, the method of United States’ 
control over these three “sovereigns” mirrors the controlling efforts over the unincorporated United 
States island territories.  This unique history of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall islands closely 
resembles the stories of the unincorporated United States’ territories of Puerto Rico, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and American Samoa.211 
The United States began its overseas expansion during the period of the Spanish-American 
War, which resulted in several Spanish territorial concessions.  In the Treaty of Paris, Spain officially 
ceded “to the United States the island of Porto [sic] Rico and other islands now under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies.”212 Consistent with the United States Constitution’s grant of 
Congress’s plenary power under the Territorial Clause, Article Nine of the treaty granted Congress 
the power over “the civil rights and political status” of the territories and its people.213 The Treaty 
of Paris endorsed the United States’ imperialistic venture as it was among the first times in American 
history that in a treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no promise of American 
citizenship.214 In addition, the treaty contained “no promise, actual or implied, of statehood.”215 As 
a result of the war, the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.216 The U.S. 
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Virgin Islands were later purchased from the Danish government in 1907.217 
While the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Guam, and Virgin Islands have obtained a form of 
citizenship, and a status of nationals for Samoans, each membership differs from traditional 
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship.  The consequential aspect of these colonized islanders’ 
subordinate membership is that unlike their brethren on the mainland, they are not entitled to 
participate in the national political process;218 they have no representation in Congress, and, as 
residents of the territories, cannot vote for President and Vice-President, and their repective 
territories bear no electoral rights.  Futher, they are not entitled to the full Constitutional protection 
and their status can arguably be stripped at any time.219 
The inhabitants of Puerto Rico were granted citizenship in 1917.  However, unlike their 
brethren on the mainland, these Americans are not entitled to participate in the national political 
process,220 are not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution, and can arguably be stripped of 
their status citizenship at any time.221 Similarly, the unincorporated territory of Guam has been 
granted this same form of American citizenship, which clearly states that as a possession of the 
United States the island can be “bought, sold, or traded by the federal government.”222 Similarly, the 
residents of the Virgin Islands were granted United States citizenship in 1927 and the inhabitants of 
the Northern Marina Islands attained citizenship in 1976.223 The residents of the unincorporated 
217 See EDIBERTO ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES NINETEENTH-TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND 
CONQUESTS (Carolina Academic Press, 2005).
218 See, e.g., Román, Alien-Citizen, supra note 96, at 1-47 (observing that the residents of Puerto Rico retain an alien 
attribute despite being United States citizens as they cannot vote for President and Vice-President and do not have 
representation in Congress).
219 See Congressional Research Service Memorandum: Discretion of Congress Respecting Citizenship Status of 
Puerto Rico (Mar. 9, 1989), in 2 PUERTO RICO: POLITICAL STATUS REFERENDUM, 1989-1991, at 81-85 
(Puerto Rico Fed. Affairs Admin. ed., 1992).
220 See, e.g., Ediberto Román, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 Fl. St. L. 
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territory of American Samoa have received even less, for as nationals they have even fewer rights. 
Accordingly, the diluted form of citizenship granted to these people under the auspices of 
Congress’s power under the Territorial Clause changed little in terms of rights but merely facilitated 
a belief of belonging to the United States.  The inhabitants were granted a title that suggested power 
in the political process, but in actuality they received little more than a label, coupled with a 
perception on their part that they were attaining something of consequence. 
Thus, the inhabitants of the unincorporated territories, with the exception of Samoans, were 
granted a title that suggested equal rights and power in the political process but, in actuality, they 
received little more than a label, coupled with a perception on their part that they were attaining 
something of consequence.  For the United States, the effect of these grants was that “[t]hose at the 
helm of all branches of the metropolitan government saw as fit that citizenship be granted for 
particular political and strategic reasons without effectuating a change in the political condition of 
the territories.”224 
For the residents of these island territories, their disenfranchised status has not only caused 
inequality of political and civil rights, but has also manifested itself through unequal economic 
treatment.225  For instance, as a result of their subordinated status, residents of Puerto Rico receive 
less favorable treatment than the mainland citizens under a number of major federal benefits 
programs.  For the residents of Puerto Rico, federal payments under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and food stamps are made at lower levels and are subject to 
224 Id. at 156.
225 Puerto Rican citizens, with the exception of federal employees, are exempt from federal income taxes on income 
earned in Puerto Rico. See IRC United States § 936 (1994).
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an overall cap.226 Similarly, the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) does not apply to 
Puerto Rico.227 Benefits under a similar program are capped and are made at lower levels than SSI 
payments made to eligible persons residing in the States.228 Benefits for needy children are likewise 
provided at appreciably lower levels.229 
Relying on the territorial incorporation doctrine, the United States Supreme Court upheld 
this unequal economic treatment.  The Justices have concluded that as long as there is a rational 
basis for the discrimination, the Court will uphold the acts.  For instance, in Califano v. Torres,230 the 
Court held that Congress can discriminate against the elderly, the blind, and the disabled if they are 
inhabitants of Puerto Rico, even thought they would otherwise be eligible under the SSI program of 
the Social Security Act.231 Similarly, in Harris v. Rosario, the Court upheld as constitutional the 
reimbursement of lower levels of AFDC to the people of Puerto Rico.232 Resting on Congress’s 
power under the Territorial Clause, the Court in these decisions summarily found a rational basis for 
disparate treatment, thereby justifying Congress’s discriminatory action.233 
Thus, United States citizenship status to the inhabitants of this country’s island conquests 
226 See S. REP. NO. 101-481, at 10-11 (1990) (“Under present law, federal social welfare programs under the Social 
Security Act such as AFDC, Medicaid, Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, 
and Social Services block grant operate differently in Puerto Rico than they do in the states. Under statehood, both 
the amount of the welfare benefits and percentage of population receiving them would increase.”); see also T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 Const. Commentary 15, 15 
(1994).
227 See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 2 (1978) (holding that government benefits of a state citizen do not transfer 
when that citizen moves to Puerto Rico).
228 See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 303(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1494 (repealing Titles, I, 
X, and XIV of the Social Security Act with the exception that these titles would still apply to Puerto Rico, Guam, 
and the Virgin Islands); see also 42 U. S.C. § 1308(a)(1) (Supp. 1997) (specifying the amount of social security 
payments to Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa); see also 41 U. S.C. § 1396(b) (1994).
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231 See id. at 4-5.
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was and remains different from that held by their mainland counterparts.234 Such membership, 
simply stated, flies in the face of basic foundational constructs of United States citizenship law.   
IV. Subordinates in Fact?
A. African-Americans 
African-Americans, without question, fall into a category of individuals who were 
subordinates in law.  This aspect of their subordination will be briefly explored here.  After 
exploring the de jure subordination of African-Americans, a conceptual shift will be made to question 
whether African-Americans are still subordinates despite attaining citizenship status with the passage 
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  While 
African Americans were finally granted United States citizenship through constitutional amendment 
following the Civil War, over a hundred years after that grant, questions persist as to whether they 
are truly American citizens.  In other words, although they may no longer be subordinates in law, 
they may be subordinates in fact.  African-Americans and other groups identified here may have 
attained official Fourteenth Amendment citizen status, but they have repeatedly been treated as 
something less than equals.  Thus, even after attaining Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, a status 
not achieved by the territorial island people, it appears that African-Americans and other racial 
minorities may be subordinates in fact. 
The depth of the frustration, estrangement, and alienation of this citizen group was 
poignantly expressed by the words of Malcolm X: 
The Black should be exempt from all taxation . . . we want the federal 
government to exempt our people from all taxation as long as we are 
234 Rivera Ramos, supra note 203, at 235 (reviewing the role of the United States Supreme Court in justifying United 
States imperialism). Ironically, the United States, as the colonial sovereign, exercises jurisdiction over the most 
basic aspects of life in the territory as it does in the states, including communications, currency, labor relations, 
postal service, environment, foreign affairs, and military defense.
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deprived of equal justice under the laws of the land…why should you 
be taxed if you don’t get anything in return? How can you be charged 
the same tax as the White man…you have no business in a 
government, as a second class citizen, paying first class taxes.  The 
government of the United States should exempt our people from all 
taxation as long as we’re deprived of equal protection of the laws . . . 
you don’t have second class citizenship anywhere on earth, you only 
have slaves and people who are free.235 
While the inferior status of African-Americans did not derive from the plenary powers 
doctrine, it derives from the United States Constitution, interpreted through similarly racist 
constructions.  As originally drafted, the Constitution excluded African-Americans in Article I, 
Section 2, which counted African-Americans as three-fifths of a free person.236 In addition, the first 
Supreme Court decision to address the political status of African-Americans did not base its decision 
on the plenary powers doctrine; it did however, arise during the same period of that doctrine’s 
creation and similar racist and nativist bases were used to subordinate indigenous people, recent 
Asian immigrants, and inhabitants of United States island conquests.  Thus, while the case that 
sanctioned the disenfranchised African-Americans was technically not a plenary powers decision, it 
is analogous in terms of its white-supremacist foundation.  
The very nature of how African-Americans arrived in this country strongly suggests that, 
particularly those born here must be citizens, as they could owe no allegiance to any other 
government of their place of birth.237 Thus, the principles of equality and membership should have 
always applied to African-Americans.  They, however, have not. 
The court-sanctioned exclusion of African-Americans is most vivid in the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,238 where the Court held that African-Americans, 
235 Malcolm X, Wisdom of Malcolm X (Black Label, Inc., Compact Disk Number BLCD3-001).
236 U.S. Const. Art. 1, §2.
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even those born in a free territory, were not United States citizens.239 In that matter, the plaintiff 
Dred Scott was born into slavery in Virginia sometime around 1800.  Scott’s master, an Army 
doctor, eventually moved him to Minnesota, a jurisdiction that forbade slavery.  Scott sued for his 
freedom claiming that he was in a free territory and therefore could not be a slave in that land. After 
engaging in an extensive discussion surrounding the meaning of citizenship, Justice Taney, writing 
for the Court, concluded “we think the Negroes are . . . not included and were not intended to be 
included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights 
and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures citizens of the United States.”240 
The Court refused to recognize citizenship for this group because of their perceived 
inferiority.241 Specifically, the Court characterized African-Americans “as beings of an inferior order, 
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race.”242 The levels or gradations of membership 
established in the very first writings on the concept of citizenship, dating back to the ancient Greek 
writings of Aristotle, were specifically endorsed in the Scott decision.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Taney declared: 
We proceed to examine the case as presented by the pleadings.  
The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ meant the 
same thing.  They both describe ‘the political body who, according 
to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold 
the power and conduct the government through their 
representatives. They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign 
239 Id. at 397. After engaging in an extensive discussion of the meaning of citizenship, Justice Taney, writing for the 
Court noted: “We think they [African-Americans] are . . . not included and were not intended to be included, under 
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instrument provides for and secures citizens of the United States.”
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William Wirt.  Asked by President Monroe whether free Negroes in Virginia were United States citizens, Wirt 
responded: “I am of the opinion that the Constitution, by the description of ‘citizens of the United States,’ intended 
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people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent 
member of this sovereignty.  The question before us is, whether the 
class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a 
portion of this people, and are constituent members of this 
sovereignty?  We think they are not, and they are not included, and 
were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizen in the 
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and 
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to 
citizens of the United States.243 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Daniel observed: 
The African . . . was regarded and owned in every State in the Union 
as property merely, and as such was not and could not be a party or 
an actor, much less peer in any compact of form of government 
established by the States or the United States . . . [S]o far as rights and 
immunities appertaining to citizens have been defined and secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, the African race is not 
and never was recognized [sic] either by language or purpose of the 
former . . . 244 
Justice Daniel went further and specifically argued that freed blacks possessed an 
intermediate membership level akin to that of a “freedman” instead of what Dred Scott argued in 
favor of—citizen.  Accordingly, as a result of the propriety of membership, Justice Daniel opined 
that African-Americans could not possess citizenship’s rights and privilege.  The Justice made 
specific references to the Roman law system of membership that included slaves, freedmen, and 
citizens as a basis to support a similar class system within the United States.   He noted: 
The institution of slavery, as it exists and has existed from the period 
of its introduction into the United States, though more humane and 
mitigated in character than was the same institution, either under the 
republic or the empire of Rome, bears, both in its tenure and in the 
simplicity incident to the mode of its exercise, a closer resemblance 
to Roman slavery than it does to the condition of villanage, as it 
formally in England.  Connected with the latter, there were 
peculiarities, from custom or positive regulation, which varied it 
materially from the slavery of the Romans, or from slavery at any 
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period within the United States. 
. . .
With regard to slavery amongst the Romans, it is by no means true 
that emancipation, either during the republic or the empire, 
conferred, by the act itself, or implied, the status or the rights of 
citizenship.245 
Ultimately, the Scott Court adopted the Roman subordinate level of participation model 
within the 1800’s American society.  Irrespective of their title of free person or slave, the African-
American could not become a full member of society.246 In other words, because of the Court’s 
endorsement of state-sanctioned racism and marginalization, non-whites, such as African-
Americans, were incapable of attaining equality in terms of full rights under the Constitution. 
Eventually, after a long, bloody, and destructive civil war, the United States Constitution was 
amended and purportedly granted “all persons” born in the United States citizenship status.  
Nonetheless, as W.E.B. Dubois questioned after the civil war, serious doubts persisted as to whether 
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African-Americans were not only free but political persons.247 Dubois noted that the Fourteenth 
Amendment emancipates a multitude with no political rights.  Accordingly, while the perception of 
many may be that emancipation would immediately evolve to enfranchisement, as Dubois feared, 
that conclusion was far from the case.248 Despite theoretically attaining citizenship and its related 
rights and anointments of belonging, African-Americans were subsequently and repeatedly treated in 
an unequal manner,249 notwithstanding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was 
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Continental Europeans, were unthinkable in the case of Africans.”  Id. at 130 (1962).  Carl Schurz, German 
immigrant, intellectual, and idealist, who traveled the South extensively in preparing a report on the reconstruction 
efforts in the gulf states for President Johnson, found the situation little improved in the years after the war. DuBois 
quotes from Schurz’s account at length and also finds corroboration from reports from several states to the 
congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction. Among Schurz’s observations: “The emancipation of the slaves 
is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in the old form could not be kept up. But although the freedman is no 
longer considered the property of the individual master, he is considered the slave of society, and all independent 
state legislation will share the tendency to make him such. The ordinances abolishing slavery passed by the 
conventions under the pressure of circumstances will not be looked upon as barring the establishment of a new form 
of servitude . . . Wherever I go—the street, the shop, the house, the hotel, or the steamboat—I hear the people talk in 
such a way as to indicate that they are yet unable to conceive of a Negro as possessing any rights at all. Men who are 
honorable in their dealings with their white neighbors, will cheat a Negro without feeling a single twinge of their 
honor. To kill a Negro, they do not deem murder; to debauch a Negro woman, they do not think fornication; to take 
property away from a Negro, they do not consider robbery. The people boast that when they get freedman’s affairs 
in their own hands, to use their expression, ‘the [expletive] will catch hell.’  The reason of all this is simple and 
manifest. The whites esteem the blacks their property by natural right, and however much they admit that the 
individual relations of masters and slaves have been destroyed by the war and by the President’s emancipation 
proclamation, they still have an ingrained feeling that the blacks at large belong to the whites at large.” Id. at 136.
248 Id. at 180.  Reconstruction evoked great fear of political equality in the South, which had already begun passing 
black codes in many of its states.  Dubois analyzes the South’s outlook thus: “Here, then, was the dominant thought 
of that South with which Reconstruction must deal.  Arising with aching head and palsied hands it deliberately 
looked backward.  There came to the presidential chair, with vast power, a man who was Southern born; with him 
came inconceivable fears that the North proposed to make these Negroes really free; to give them a sufficient status 
even for voting, to give them the right to hold office; that there was even a possibility that these slaves might out-
vote their former masters; that they might accumulate wealth, achieve education, and finally, they might even aspire 
to marry white women and mingle their blood with the blood of their masters.  Nevertheless, lest the North attempt 
to claim the moral upper hand on enfranchisement issues, one must recall that voting was still a privilege for ‘whites 
only’ in states like Ohio, Maryland (a split loyalty state during the Civil War), and New Jersey in 1867.”  JOHN 
HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 74 (University of Chicago Press, 1961).   
249 See STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE: THE WAY IT WAS (Florida Atlantic University Press, 1990).  
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supposed to grant them full citizenship status. As a reconstruction amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was enacted to specifically recognize that African-Americans born in the United States 
were citizens.  In the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
which prohibited “any person” from denying “any citizen” access to privately owned places of 
public accommodations on the basis of race.250 Justice Bradley confirmed the lower citizenship 
status of African-Americans when he declared: 
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before 
the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty, 
and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, 
though it was any invasion of their personal status as freemen 
because they were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white 
citizens, or because they were subjected to discrimination in the 
enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances, and 
places of amusement.251 
Scholars have chronicled the pre-Civil War, as well as post-Civil War, disenfranchisement of 
African-Americans.  These chronicles trace the post-Civil War efforts by white Southerners to 
immediately attempt to implement a de facto form of slavery through efforts such as the “Black 
Codes” designed to ban political participation in particular, and destroy any pretense of equality, in 
general.252 These oppressive efforts occurred with the full support of President Andrew Johnson.253 
The continued disparate treatment of these people, which was often sanctioned by the Court, 
created the de facto inferior citizenship status of this group.254 For instance, despite the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in Plessy v. Ferguson,255 Justice Brown, writing for the majority, upheld a 
250 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 480. See also W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 249, at 166-79; KENNEDY, supra note 251.
253 KENNEDY, supra note 251.
254 For an excellent discussion of the history of the disenfranchisement of African-Americans, see Carlton 
Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events (manuscript available with the author).
255 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) (the Court rejected petitioner's argument that the separation of the two 
races stamped one race with a badge of inferiority.).
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statute that required the segregation of white and “colored” persons.256 Justice Brown based his 
discussion on a constructed distinction between social and legal quality.257 He concluded that “[t]he 
object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two 
races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality.”258 
The social versus legal distinction of Plessy replicated the tortured logic of Dred Scott despite 
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plessy Court reiterated that, notwithstanding the 
Amendment’s declarations that “all persons born or naturalized” would be citizens, African-
Americans were not recognized as true citizens; African-Americans were citizens in name, not in 
law.  The concepts of equality of rights and equality of opportunity were inapplicable to them.  Even 
after the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, which was specially passed to acknowledge the 
freedom and equality of former slaves, the Supreme Court in Plessy reiterated that African-Americans 
could be treated unequally.  Indeed, they were something less, perhaps even still slaves, to borrow 
Malcolm X’s sentiments.   These events highlight that despite attaining a status that is supposed to 
connote equality, African-Americans, at least during the era closely following the reconstruction 
amendments of the Constitution, were not full and equal citizens. 
Though Brown v. Bd. of Education259 specifically rejected the separate but equal dichotomy of 
256 Id. at 544. Justice Brown based the opinion’s rationale on a constructed distinction between social and legal 
equality. Specifically, the Justice observed “[t]he object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute 
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality.” The social versus legal 
distinction of Plessy replicated the subordinated status of African-Americans even after the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  It reiterated that notwithstanding the Amendment’s declarations that “all persons born or 
naturalized” would be citizens, African-Americans were only citizens in name, de jure citizens, but not citizens in 
practice.  The concepts of “equality of rights” and “equality of opportunity” were inapplicable to them.  Drimmer, 
supra note 57, at 396.  Even after the constitutional amendment that was enacted to acknowledge their freedom and 
equality, the Supreme Court reiterated that they were not true citizens, but second-class citizens or in Malcolm X’s 
words, perhaps still slaves.
257 Id. at 544.
258 Id. at 884.
259 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (the Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson and the “separate 
but equal” doctrine, finding that it had no place in public education. Segregation was a denial of the equal protection 
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Separate educational facilities were inherently unequal.).
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Plessy, even that decision failed to lift segregation’s stigma in public schools, as evidenced by the 
Brown II decision, its progeny, and the social phenomenon of white-flight.  African-Americans to this 
day face either unequal treatment or must be members of a group that repeatedly face a series of 
unfortunate events.260 These examples may come from a variety of circumstances including: racial 
profiling by police, such as DWB or “Driving While Black,”261 or the more subtle forms of 
subordination as identified by Ellis Close in his book The Rage of a Privileged Class,262 where he 
addresses how African-Americans, irrespective of their academic or financial achievements, are 
repeatedly reminded of their inequality of society.263 
A recent manifestation of the African American subordinate citizenship debate concerns the 
voting representation of residents in the District of Columbia.  Of the over 550,000 residents of 
D.C., 60% are African American.264 While members of this community pay federal and local taxes, 
serve in the armed forces, and serve on juries to uphold federal law and policies, these residents have 
260 I am often reminded of this subordinated status when I recall when a dear friend, who happens to be African-
American and named Rodney King, oddly enough, wanted to leave my house after a long debate about racial 
politics at around 2:00 a.m.  I told him to stay because the bus station, the New York/New Jersey Port Authority, 
wasn’t very safe.  He simply reminded me “Ed, remember I’m black, everyone sees me as a criminal, so they are 
scared -- I’ve got more problems with cops.”  This saddened me and still does because you see my friend, who 
happens to be the most honest and honorable man I’ve ever met, could never take off the chains of stigma and 
subordination.  It reminds me that despite my pride and willingness to fight for racial justice, I can hide.  Because of 
racial  constructions based on skin color,  I can put on a suit or sweats and be the proverbial boy next door.  My best 
friend can rarely, if ever, do that and I hope I never forget that fact.
261
 For a detailed exposé of the too often substantiated perception that blacks often face greater scrutiny at the hands 
of police officers than whites, see David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, And The Law: Why "Driving While 
Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999). 
262 ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (Harper Perennial, 1993).
263 Id. at 4-10 (“You feel the rage of people, [of] your group . . . just being the dogs of society.”). Note: on micro-
aggression often non-minority speakers and actors are oblivious to the repetitive, debasing innuendoes, even 
unintended disrespectful comments that comprise micro-aggression.  See Peggy C. Davis, Symposium: Popular 
Legal Culture, Law as Micro-aggression, 98 Yale L.J. 1559 (1989).  In a synthesis of writings on the topic, Prof. 
Davis explains micro-aggression as “ . . . subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are ‘put 
downs’ of blacks by offenders . . . Psychiatrists who have studied black populations view them as ‘incessant and 
cumulative’ assaults on black self-esteem.” (citations omitted); reprinted in RICHARD DELGADO AND JEAN 
STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (New York University Press, 2001).
264
 US Census, 2000 available at http://www.census.gov/.
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no voting representation in Congress.265 It wasn’t until 1961 when the Twenty-Third Amendment of 
the Constitution was ratified by the states, in which the residents of the District of Columbia were 
granted the right to vote in presidential elections.266 This marked the first time that United States 
citizens—who were not residing within the political, governmental unit of a state—were granted the 
right to vote in presidential elections.267 However, this is their only voice in the political process.  
Voters in the District of Columbia elect a delegate to the House of Representatives who can vote in 
committee and draft legislation, but who does not have full voting rights.268 Additionally, voters 
elect two “shadow” senators269 and one shadow representative270 as non-voting representatives who 
lobby Congress on District of Columbia issues and concerns.  Denial of Congressional 
representation to the predominantly African American community in the District of Columbia to at 
least some scholars “not only suggests a belief in the unfitness of the population to participate 
equally in national life but creates the kind of ‘uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid’ that 
the Supreme Court condemned and invalidated . . . ”271 
More recent “unfortunate events” faced by African-Americans is evidenced by the treatment 
of this group during the 2000 presidential election.  In a racially charged national election that was 
decided by less than 700 votes in the pivotal State of Florida, a state where the governor is the 
brother of the election’s eventual victor, and where both brothers were strongly disliked by a 
majority of African-American voters due to their positions on matters such as civil rights, the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights investigated widespread allegations of discrimination of African-
265
 Jasmin B. Raskin, Is This America?  The District of Columbia and the Right To Vote, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 
39, 40 (1999).  See also, Aaron E. Price, A Representative Democracy: An Unfulfilled Ideal For Citizens of the 
District of Columbia, 7 U. D.C. L. Rev. 77 (2003).
266 U.S. CONST. amend XXIII.
267 Amber L. Cottle, Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and the Right To Vote In Presidential 
Elections, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 315, 325 (1995).
268
 Currently, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes represents the District of Columbia in this capacity.
269
 Shadow Senator Paul Strauss and Shadow Senator Florence Pendleton currently serve the District of Columbia.
270
 Shadow Representative Ray Browne currently serves the District of Columbia.
271
 Raskin, supra note 267, at 43-44.
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Americans on election day.  The Commission’s report found numerous irregularities on Election 
Day and confirmed that perhaps thousands of African-Americans may have been denied their right 
to vote.272 The report concluded: (1) the most dramatic undercount in Florida election was the 
uncast ballots of countless eligible voters who were wrongfully turned away from the polls; (2) 
statistical data, reinforced by credible anecdotal evidence, pointed to the widespread denial of voting 
rights; and (3) the disenfranchisement of Florida’s voters fell most harshly on the shoulders of 
African-American voters.  The report concluded that the magnitude of the impact could be seen 
from any of several perspectives: 
• Statewide, based upon county-level statistical estimates, black voters were nearly 
ten times more likely than non-black voters to have their ballots rejected. 
• Estimates indicated that approximately 14.4 percent of Florida’s black voters cast 
ballots that were rejected.  This compared with approximately 1.6 percent of 
non-black Florida voters who did not have their presidential votes counted. 
• Statistical analysis showed that the disparity in ballot spoilage rates—i.e., ballots 
cast but not counted—between black and non-black voters was not the result of 
education or literacy differences. 
• Approximately 11 percent of Florida voters were African-American; however, 
African-Americans cast about 54 percent of the 187,000 spoiled ballots in 
Florida.273 
The Commission found further troubling facts concerning the election including that there 
was a high correlation between counties and precincts with a high percentage of African-American 
voters and the percentages of spoiled ballots.  It concluded that nine of the ten counties with the 
272 Executive Summary, The United States Commission on Civil Rights Report on Voting Irregularities in Florida 
During the 2000 Presidential Election, available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/exesum.htm.
273 Id. 
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highest percentage of African-American voters had spoilage rates above the Florida average; of the 
ten counties with the highest percentage of white voters, only two counties had spoilage rates above 
the state average.  Gadsden County, with the highest rate of spoiled ballots, also had the highest 
percentage of African-American voters.  The data further showed that 83 of the 100 precincts with 
the highest numbers of spoiled ballots were black-majority precincts.274 
B. Mexican-Americans 
Mexican-Americans are another group whose equal treatment under the law is suspect. Their 
theoretical inclusion as subordinates arose during the same period of the first use of the plenary 
powers doctrine was similarly based on racist and nativistic perspectives.  As one writer noted: “Fifty 
years before the pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, there were Latino-Latina urban centers in New 
Mexico and in Florida.  Yet, Latinos and Latinas, according to most Americans, are our most recent 
arrivals–and they have some basis for thinking that.”275 Many Americans know that the United States 
conquered land from the indigenous people consisting of approximately “two million square miles 
of territory by conquest and by purchase.”276 What is not as well known is the fact that the United 
States conquered Mexico in 1848 and took over half its then-existing territory.  The states of 
California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as portions of Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming 
were created from a 529,000 square mile cession by the Republic of Mexico.277 
The taking of the Mexican land was a result of the nation’s westward expansion as journalist 
John O’Sullivan noted in 1845: 
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery, 
exploration, settlement, contiguity, etc.  The American claim is by the 
274 Id.
275 Harry Pachon, Special Report: What Color is the Constitution? Crossing the Border of Discrimination: Has the 
Civil Rights Movement Ignored Generations of Hispanics?, 15-FALL Hum Rts. 32, 33 (1988) 
276 Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
26 N.M.L. Rev. 201, 201 (1996).
277 Id.
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right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to posses the whole 
of the continent which Providence has given us for the development 
of the great experiment of liberty and federative self-government 
entrusted to us.  It is a right such as that of the tree to the space of air 
and earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle and destiny of 
growth.278 
Prompted by this spirit of ‘manifest destiny,’ the United States declared war against Mexico 
to acquire additional territory.279 The result was the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
which states in part: 
The United States of America, and the United Mexican States, 
animated by a sincere desire to put an end to the calamities of the war 
which unhappily exists between the two Republics, and to establish 
upon a solid basis relations of peace and friendship, which shall 
confer reciprocal benefits upon the citizens of both, and assure, 
harmony and mutual confidence, wherein the two peoples should 
live, as good neighbors . . . 280 
Among other things, the treaty provided that the United States would respect private property rights 
of Mexican citizens in the newly created portions of the United States and those individuals would 
be granted United States citizenship.281 
However, as had occurred with the indigenous peoples,282 many of the treaty provisions were 
never honored.283 Despite the treaty’s pledge to “secure Mexicans their rights to property, by the 
turn of the century almost all Mexican-owned land was lost during the land grant adjudication 
278 Id. at 208 (citing to RICHARD WHITE, IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN, A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN WEST 73 (1991). 
279 Id.
280 Guadalupe T. Luna, En El Nombre De Dios Todo-Poderoso:  The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Narrativos 
Legales, 5 S.W. J.L. & Trade Am. 45 (1998) (citing to Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the 
Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mex., 9 Stat. 922).
281 Kle in, supra note 278, at 214. 
282 Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved? And We Are Not 
Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice, By Derrick Bell, 97 Yale L.J. 923, 940 (1988). Hereinafter “Derrick 
Bell.” In fact, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was “modeled after ones drawn up between the United States and 
various Indian tribes, and was given similar treatment . . . property [was] stolen, rights were denied, language and 
culture suppressed, opportunities for employment, education, and political representation were thwarted.”
283 Luna, supra note 282, at 71.
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process [and] . . . challenges from squatters, settlers, and land speculators also promoted land 
alienation.”  Most fundamentally, “many Mexican citizens, transformed by the Treaty into United 
States citizens of Mexican descent, and their descendants, never enjoyed full membership rights in 
this society, despite the Treaty’s promise that they would.”284 As Professor Richard Delgado 
observed: 
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo purported to guarantee to 
Mexicans caught on the United States side of the border, full 
citizenship and civil rights, as well as protection of their culture and 
language.  The Treaty, modeled after ones drawn up between the 
United States and various Indian tribes, was given similar treatment: 
The Mexicans properties were stolen, rights were denied, language 
and culture suppressed, opportunities for employment, education, 
and political representation were thwarted.285 
Mexican-Americans were disenfranchised in numerous other ways including immigration. 
The Constitution and the courts did little to interfere with the racist immigration quotas, the Bracero 
system, and dragnet searches, seizures, and deportations of anyone who looked Mexican.286 In 
theory, the Treaty, which ended the Mexican-American War of 1846 to 1848, promised ‘grace and 
justice’ by codifying the principal diplomatic objectives of each party.  For the United States, ‘grace’ 
meant purchasing, for the bargain-basement price of $15 million, thousands and thousands of acres 
of former Mexican territories. For Mexico, ‘justice’ meant protecting the civil and property rights of 
Mexican citizens, including Indians, who without moving had suddenly become new residents (and 
citizens) of a foreign nation.287 As one writer observed: 
In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and in numerous Indian treaties, 
the United States promised to respect property rights of the 
conquered.  To make such promises during the nation’s idealistic 
youth or during its feverish expansion across a seemingly-unlimited 
284 Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S./Mexico Relations: The Tale of Two Treaties, 
5 S. W. J.L. & Trade Am. 121, 123 (1998).
285
 Delgado, supra note 284.
286 Id.
287 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Mexican Americans in the United States on the Sesquicentennial of the 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 5 S. W. J.L. & Trade Am. 5, 6 (1998).
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continent is one thing; to keep them is quite another.288 
Despite the grant of United States citizenship pursuant to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
in 1848, over one hundred years later Mexican-Americans were still not accepted as full members of 
the body politic.  For instance, in 1954, the United States government initiated “Operation 
Wetback,” the campaign to deport undocumented Mexicans.289 During this massive campaign, over 
one million290 Mexican immigrants, as well as United States citizens of Mexican ancestry, and 
undoubtedly other Latinas and Latinos, were deported.291 The Mexican-American community was 
directly affected by this campaign because it was “aimed at racial groups, which meant that the 
burden of proving citizenship fell totally upon people of Mexican descent.”  Those unable to present 
such proof were arrested and sent to Mexico.292 
Moreover, when examining the disenfranchisement of Mexican-Americans one does not 
have to look further than the popular depictions of illegal immigrants as Mexicans who have illegally 
crossed the border, despite the fact that many illegal immigrants are individuals overstaying their 
visas.293 A classic example of the current anti-Mexican-American fervor and the potential 
consequences of such labeling is California’s attempt to implement Proposition 187, which would 
have denied aliens access to government-funded social services including health care and 
education.294 The campaign to pass Proposition 187 played a consequential role295 in former 
288 Kle in, supra note 278, at 253; see also Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race: The Theory of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. Miami L. Rev. 691 (1999).
289 JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN 
AMERICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 229-231 (Greenwood Press, 1980); see also JULIAN 
SAMORA, LOS MOJADOS: THE WETBACK STORY 52 (1971).
290 Garcia, supra note 291, at 227.
291 See RONALD T. TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR (Little, Brown & Co. 1993).
292 See Garcia, supra note 291, at 231; Samora, supra note 291, at 52.
293 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 955 (2ed. 1997).
294 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West); see also Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the 
Constitutional Community, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 707 (1996).
295 See Ron Unz, How the Republicans Lost California, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 28, 2000, at A18 (explaining that 
“California isn’t too liberal for the GOP . . . [but that] Republicans simply scared away immigrant voters”). 
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California Governor Pete Wilson’s re-election campaign.296 Television advertisements emphasized 
Wilson’s support for the proposition as they depicted “shadowy Mexicans” crossing the border in 
large numbers.297 Much of the support for the proposition used loaded pejoratives such as “those 
little f--kers” and even suggested that California may become a “third world country” or 
“annexed.”298 Obviously, Proposition 187, though facially neutral, centered on the issue of race and 
proponents gained support by stirring the fear of the foreigner.299 While some may suggest that 
appropriate immigration limits are warranted, if Proposition 187 had been implemented, further 
subordination and resulting stigmatization of Mexican-Americans and other Latina-Latino 
immigrants would likely result with profound negative effects.300 
Similarly, if Proposition 187 had been implemented, authorities could presume that those of 
Mexican ancestry and even other Latinas and Latinos were illegal; this presumption could lead to the 
denial of benefits and related deprivations for Latinas and Latinos unless they could prove 
citizenship.  Such negative consequences have resulted from provisions of United States 
Immigration Laws that permit sanctions against those who employ undocumented persons.301 In 
fact, the United States Commission on Civil Rights has found “no doubt that the employer 
sanctions have caused many employers to implement discriminatory hiring practices.” 302 
C. Other Non-Whites 
Several legal scholars have addressed the outsider or foreign status of other ethnic citizens in 
296 Takaki, supra note 293, at 1144.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 1143-45.
299 Id.
300 Unz, supra note 297, at 1139.
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the United States.  Several writings have turned to the treatment of Asian-Americans to demonstrate 
their subordinate status notwithstanding their attainment of citizenship.  According to these 
works,303 American society has imposed a label of foreignness on several groups of American 
citizens.304 The scholarship includes Latina and Latino citizens, Asian-Americans, Arab-Americans, 
and other non-whites in the category of other non-white/non-black subordinates.305 In addition to 
being characterized as the “forgotten Americans” and the “invisible” members of society, they are 
303 See Román, supra note 96. 
304 See Kevin R. Johnson, The End Of "Civil Rights" As We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New 
Millennium, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1481, 1486-1489 (2002).  As Johnson observes, “Over the course of its history, U.S. 
society consistently has viewed new waves of immigrants as racially different outsiders . . . At different historical 
moments, German, Irish, Jewish, and Italian immigrants all were deemed to be of different and inferior racial stock . 
. . Benjamin Franklin, for example, decried the settling of German immigrants in Pennsylvania and considered them 
to be of a different race than the English. . . . Lawful exclusion of certain groups of immigrants reinforced their 
status as racially inferior . . . thereby contributing to the construction, and maintenance, of racial categories.  At first 
glance, the racialization of European national origin groups is wholly incongruous with modern notions of race, 
particularly the almost reflexive treatment of all Europeans as white. . . . Classifying European immigrants as 
nonwhite becomes understandable only with the realization that race is a social and legal creation. The social 
assimilation, or "whitening," of various immigrant groups, such as the Irish . . . and Jews . . . which occurred slowly 
over time, reveals how concepts of races are figments of our collective imagination, albeit with real-life 
consequences.  The racial classification of various immigrant groups reflects the fluidity of racial constructions. 
Immigrants from Asia, the focus of the initial federal immigration laws, long have been classified as racially 
different . . . Differences of physical appearance contribute to the resilience of the racial classification of persons of 
Asian ancestry, which contrasts with the erosion of such classifications for European immigrants . . . Immigrants 
from Mexico and Latin America continue to be racialized in the United States, just as all persons of Mexican and 
Latin American ancestry historically have been in this country . . . Physical appearance, class, cultural, linguistic, 
and religious differences contribute to this racialization. Racial distinctions have resulted in housing and education 
segregation and other forms of discrimination, particularly in the Southwest . . . The demise of concepts of "race" 
and "races," and the assimilation of racial minorities into the mainstream, is in part a function of physical 
appearance. For example, an Anglo-appearing Latina/o is more likely to be treated socially as white . . . As people of 
color from Latin America and Asia continue migrating to the United States, it becomes more likely that physical 
appearance differences will remain prominent in U.S. society. This contributes to the maintenance of popular 
perceptions of racial difference. Consequently, continued migration--with no apparent end in sight--differs from 
previous immigration patterns. . . With a different culture and religious faith, persons of Arab ancestry or Muslim 
faith also have been treated as racially different, even though most racial categorization schemes consider them 
white . . . Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001 . . . Arab and Muslim immigrants had been subject to 
special immigration procedures as presumed "terrorists" and effectively treated as a distinct and separate race . . . In 
the aftermath of that horrible loss of life, Arab- and Muslim-appearing persons became the focus of the ‘war on 
terrorism,’ . . . experiencing special treatment at airports . . . interrogations, arrests, and detention . . . and suffering 
hate crimes, including murder . . . ”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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arguably endowed with the immutable characteristic of alien or foreigner.306 Noting that race 
relations in America are typically analyzed in the white-over-black paradigm, Professor Gotanda has 
argued that this construct has the effect of facilitating the failure to examine the unique racism faced 
by the non-white non-black racial minorities.307 In the white-over-black paradigm, if a person is not 
white, then that person is socially regarded as something other than American.308 
An example of the inferior status of other non-whites is the historical use of the plenary 
powers doctrine to justify the deportation and exclusion of undesirable Asian immigrants who 
otherwise were entitled to enter or stay in the United States.  In the Chinese Exclusion cases the 
United States Supreme Court first extended the plenary powers doctrine to immigration.  In Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States309 the plaintiff, a Chinese resident, obtained a required certificate of re-entry 
pursuant to an 1884 law established by Congress and visited family in China.  Prior to his return, 
Congress passed a new law precluding re-entry of all Chinese workers, irrespective of whether they 
had a certificate of re-entry.  The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the government had 
violated an international treaty as well as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Though 
acknowledging a technical violation of the treaty with China, the Court decided to enforce the 
Congressional action under the “last in time rule,” whereby a court would uphold a federal law that 
conflicts with a treaty even if it violates international law.310 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court 
iterated Congress’ power to regulate the rights of immigrants, which was deemed an inherent power 
of the government to protect itself from foreign threats.  In practice, then as it is now, the foreign 
306 Professor Gotanda in his work concerning “the Miss Saigon Syndrome” addressed the label of foreignness in 
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threat was typically categorized in racial constructions as non-white.311 
The preceding section illustrated how two of the three classic means of attaining 
citizenship—(1) Jus Soli or acquisition of the status by birth by being in this country and (2) Jus 
Sanguinis or being born of a United States citizens—were not sufficient for the attainment of full or 
equal citizenship status for a wide variety of people of color, including the indigenous people of the 
United States and the inhabitants of the island conquests.  Thus, the history of birthright citizenship 
has been raced or perverted by the pernicious and yet lesser-known side of the citizenship duality.  
V. The Raced Nature of Naturalization
Unfortunately, the other means of attaining membership status under the Citizenship Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied in an equally racist manner as recently documented 
in the book White By Law, where Ian Haney Lopez chronicled the history of United States 
naturalization law.312 Pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress is empowered 
“to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.”313 Haney Lopez observed that “from the start, 
Congress exercised this power in a manner that burdened naturalization laws with racial restrictions 
that tracked these in law of birthright citizenship.”314 
For instance, the first naturalization act enacted in 1790 limited naturalization to “any alien, 
being a free white person who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the 
United States for a term of two years.”315 For over 162 years, race was a determining factor in 
whether one could become naturalized.  It was only after the Civil War in 1870 that African-
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Americans could be naturalized.316 From 1870 until 1952 when strict white versus black racial 
prerequisites were abolished whites and blacks could be naturalized, but other minority group 
members, particularly Asians, could not.  During the period of these racial prerequisites applicants 
from Hawaii, China, Japan, Burma, and the Philippines, as well as all mixed-race applicants, failed in 
their naturalization arguments before courts.317 Courts, however, concluded that applicants from 
Mexico and Armenia were “white,” but vacillated over the whiteness of applicants from India, Syria, 
and Arabia.318 Not only were these naturalization laws shameful examples of this country’s racist 
hostility to non-whites, but these hostilities were specifically expressed, ironically, through the 
concept of citizenship.  Haney Lopez cogently summarized the effect of such exclusionary efforts: 
The prerequisite cases make clear that law does more than simply 
codify race in the limited sense of merely giving legal definition to 
pre-existing social categories.  Instead, legislatures and courts have 
served not only to fix boundaries of race in the forms we recognize 
today, but also to define the content of racial identities and to specify 
their relative privilege or disadvantage in United States society.  The 
operation of law does far more than merely legalize race; it defines as 
well the spectrum of domination and subordination that constitutes 
race relations.319 
That awful chapter in our nation’s history, which legally validated segregation and racial 
subjugation, also propagated those same racist ideologies through the concept of membership in the 
body politic.  There is no more powerful or efficient method of disassociating those unwanted 
ethnic and racial groups from the more desirable majority than by excluding them from membership 
into “Our Country.”  If Aristotle was correct and a nation is little more than a composite “like any 
other whole, made up of many parts [and] these [parts] are the citizens that compose it,”320 then this 
tool of alienation forces those unfit for membership to become parts of nothing—aliens in their 
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own land. 
Having understood the mechanics of the duplicitous application of the citizenship concept, 
the question begged is: What should the ideal form of citizenship look like?  While this is a simple 
question with an altogether very complex and possibly controversial answer, a review of the 
citizenship construct’s current manifestation is in order before exploring an arguably more 
aspirational vision of citizenship.  
VI. The Contemporary Domestic Development 
Contemporary domestic citizenship theory was significantly influenced not only by the ancient 
and Eighteenth Century philosophers, but also by the work of T. H. Marshall’s 1949 “Citizenship 
and Social Class.”321 Marshall divides citizenship rights into three categories: civil rights, political 
rights, and social rights. Virtually every academic discourse since Marshall’s work has used his rights-
based paradigm.  This not to say, however, that the Marshall framework is not without its critics.  
Marshall’s liberal framework has been criticized by both the political left and right.  The new right 
school on citizenship criticizes the framework for focusing on a passive model of membership 
without any significant obligations attached to citizenship.322  While the notion of greater civic 
participation is appealing when one considers, just to name two examples, the recent wave of tax 
breaks for the rich in this country323 and the disproportionate representation in the military by 
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children of the poor, working-poor, and of color,324 the new right’s vision of obligations appears 
selective.  On the left, cultural pluralists advocate differentiated citizenship or preferred citizenship 
rights for marginalized groups because citizenship has been defined as rights for white men.325 The 
pluralists argue that rights, including special rights and exemptions, should depend upon group 
membership.  While also sounding appealing, the pluralists’ model, practically and politically 
speaking, is highly unlikely to be achieved.  More importantly, as this article demonstrates, there has 
always existed differentiated citizenship; it has just worked to marginalize the politically weak.  To 
borrow from Derek Bell’s interest convergence theory, without any incentive for the majority, the 
question that arises is how will citizenship theory and practice make a 180 degree turnaround to now 
favor the minority?  Another group, the communitarians, call for a greater emphasis and focus on 
civil or social associations, such as churches, charities, or neighborhood associations to promote 
more active citizenship and responsibilities.326 
While devoteés of the communitarian, cultural pluralist, and new right schools of citizenship 
have questioned or expanded upon Marshall’s rights-based focus,327 virtually all groups address 
citizenship through Marshall’s rights-based framework. In fact, virtually all citizenship discourse for 
the latter part of the last century implicitly or explicitly derived from Marshall’s theoretical model.  
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According to Marshall’s framework, a properly functioning liberal welfare state is required to 
guarantee complete civil, political, and social rights to all citizens.328 Accordingly, the welfare state by 
ensuring full rights to all ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society.329 
This contemporary domestic construction of citizenship would seem to refer not only to 
delineated rights but also to a broad concept of equal membership or incorporation into the 
body politic.330 A correlative of this concept is a sense of belonging and participation in the 
community that is the nation.331 This last component, which contains both legal and conceptual 
aspects, demonstrates a psychological component of the term.  This construction suggests that the 
anointment of citizenship is an important title that goes to the heart of the individual's feeling of 
inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of the value and virtue of the democracy.332 
VII. A New Construction
The classical contemporary writer on the subject, T.H. Marshall, probably had it right.  He 
envisioned and elaborated on a model that has an egalitarian and inclusive bent coupled with an 
affirmative obligation by the state to achieve the goals of equal citizenship.  The communitarian 
model for greater civic participation through associations expands upon this model without 
necessarily contracting it.  The new right’s vision reeks of the perceived classic conservative effort to 
focus blame on the weak. 
To step back for a moment, the classic ancient writers, such as Aristotle, also extolled 
theories facially based on inclusion, but Greek and Roman leaders, as well as many others in their 
practice, included slavery and elitism within their framework as a natural extension of citizenship.  
However, the classical notion was at least honest in the sense that it never purported to be 
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something it was not, namely, a wholly inclusionary and egalitarian architecture for socio-political 
function.  The Greeks admitted with blunt sincerity the inferiority of their subjects and slaves.  Plato, 
author of that famous model for republican government, wrote in his Laws, that “the soul of the 
slave is utterly corrupt, and . . . no man of sense ought to trust [him].”333 
Certainly, this is far from an ideal application of the egalitarian concept of citizenship.  It is, 
nevertheless, truthful about its citizenship architecture.  This is far from the case in the United 
States.  With one hand, we argue with the laudable words of John Locke, James Madison, and 
Thomas Jefferson, and the other hand, we ignore the subordinate legal status of the indigenous 
peoples of our land and the inhabitants of our island colonies. We, in essence, in almost an 
unnoticed fashion, declare that certain groups of persons cannot be admitted or fully accepted.  The 
solution is not merely to accept the hypocritical result of citizenship theory’s egalitarian nature vis-à-
vis its application, but, indeed, to apply the egalitarian concept in accordance with the principles of 
nationhood that this country espouses. 
While some may argue, as others have for over 2500 years, that a nation’s greatness depends 
on the caliber of its citizens, one should remember that the survival of an idea does not necessarily 
make it any more correct or less narrow-minded.  Accordingly, T.H. Marshall’s status and rights 
based paradigm, which focuses on the state’s obligation to ensure the full effectuation of all political, 
civil, and social rights for all citizens, is a framework that should be followed.  Marshall’s framework 
is the closest means to ensure the nation’s greatness is achieved, not through constructions of 
superiority, but through recognition of equality.  By ensuring the guarantee of fundamental rights to 
all its citizens and the equal application of those rights to every member, can greatness be accurately 
measured?  Nonetheless, the first step towards achieving that laudable goal is to acknowledge the 
wrongs of the past. Specifically, this land has to admit that for too long it managed to use 
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constructions under the law to exclude disfavored groups of every sort throughout civilization’s 
history.  The unforgivable act, however, is that this exclusion has all too often been advanced 
through a concept fundamentally believed to be egalitarian in nature, which demeans the unwanted 
group more than would any other form of alienation.    
VIII. Conclusion
The United States government’s prosecution of similarly situated individuals that were 
accused of engaging in terrorist activities or engaging in war against the United States varies greatly.  
The most obvious difference in John Walker Lindh, Yaser Esam Hamdi, and Jose Padilla is that, 
while they are United States citizens, they are of different ethnic backgrounds.  While we cannot be 
certain of the basis for their disparate treatment, what we do know is: (1) One accused was of Arab-
descent, one was Puerto Rican, the other was Caucasian.  (2) The government put the Caucasian 
through our traditional legal system, where he had his day in court and decided to plead guilty; the 
government never produced any evidence against the Arab-descendant, but nevertheless gave him 
little option other than to renounce his citizenship and agree to be deported or face the possibility of 
indefinite confinement; the Puerto Rican remains to this day confined indefinitely as an enemy 
combatant.  The disparate treatment of these individuals provides fodder for the critics of the 
neutrality of the law.  The government’s action also raises questions concerning the raced nature of 
the domestic war on terror, and will likely be part of the ongoing civil rights versus national security 
debate following September 11. 
This project uses the current debate regarding the appropriate levels of civil rights held by 
those accused of terrorism to contextualize a broader debate concerning the application of the 
citizenship construct and the rights associated with that construct. The bulk of the literature on both 
sides of the post-September 11, civil rights-national security debate merely compares the treatment 
of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans after September 11 to the World War II era Japanese 
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internment cases.  While such comparisons are appropriate, the disparate treatment of citizens dates 
considerably further back than World War II.  Differences or gradations of citizenship are the little 
known component of the construct of citizenship.  While the term is almost universally recognized 
as including a notion of equality among all those holding the title, the application, as well as a lesser 
known aspect of the construct, also condones inequality among those who should or do hold the 
status.  While historically these differences between the members of a society often manifested 
themselves in terms of differences in gender or economic class, the differences or stratifications in 
the domestic arena have more vividly demonstrated themselves when ethnic and racial minority 
groups sought full and equal membership.  Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court and 
Congress throughout this country’s history have repeatedly refused to grant individuals from such 
group’s full membership.  While these denials have to some extent been ameliorated by 
constitutional amendments, to this day certain groups, such as the indigenous people of this land 
and the territorial island people, still hold a formal de jure inferior citizenship status.  Other groups, 
such as African-Americans continue to challenge whether the formal grant of citizenship, through 
vehicles such as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, granted them full civil and political 
participation. 
The preceding pages have thus examined a little-addressed phenomenon concerning the 
history of citizenship.  What emerges from this examination is the fact that despite the repeated 
inclusive declarations dating back to the term’s genesis, not all who have possessed the status, or by 
definition of the concept should have held the status, have had anything resembling the full 
compliment of rights one would expect from the status.  In the domestic arena, despite a 
constitutional amendment that is premised on equality of membership, that bestows citizenship on 
all born or naturalized in the United States, and was specifically written to endow African-Americans 
with the status of citizenship, a history of United States citizenship reveals that disfavored groups 
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rarely easily attained citizenship status.  And when such groups, particularly ethnic and racial 
minorities, attained the de jure status, the United States repeatedly denied full membership or 
participation in the American body politic.  Indeed, each and every major racial minority group 
within the United States during this country’s crucial juridical period exploring the bounds and 
applicability of citizenship—from roughly 1822-1922—the Supreme Court defined citizenship in 
such a manner to exclude the minority group from a notion of full or equal citizenship.  This 
phenomenon of differentiated levels of participation occurred when, in addition to other disfavored 
groups, African-Americans, the indigenous people of this land, and the inhabitants of the territorial 
islands challenged their status as citizens.   
Largely basing their decisions on racist and xenophobic constructions, the Court and 
Congress disenfranchised these groups.  To this day, some within this society, which by the 
definition of the concept should be full and equal citizens, continue to exist in a formal or de jure 
inferior status.  As witnessed by the Civil Rights Commission Report on the 2000 Presidential 
Election, others such as African-Americans, despite a civil war, a constitutional amendment, and an 
era of civil rights, may actually remain in a less than equal status.  A new vision of citizenship is 
needed: one where the proclamations of equality are not just laudable declarations that merely 
espouse an ideal that is attainable for only certain groups within a society.  The question that remains 
is: When will constitutional scholars, practitioners, jurists, political leaders, activists, and the 
populous insist that the stratifications of citizenship come to an end? 
 
